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FOREWORD
Space shuttle characteristics are expected to allow selective easing
of many cost-inducing criteria now required of payloads placed in orbit by
expendable launch systems. Of particular interest is the prerequisite of
identifying and differentiating between the minimum, mandatory design and
verification criteria for sortie payloads and all other criteria for pay-
load projects.
The TRW Systems Group under two concurrent contracts to NASA/JSC
(NAS9-12741 and NAS9-12742) has performed a combined study effort entitled
"Space Shuttle Sortie Payload Crew Safety and Systems Compatibility Criteria"
for the express purpose of addressing the determination of mandatory and
discretionary design and verification criteria applicable to sortie pay-
loads from operational space shuttle management viewpoint. The study pro-
jects were performed during the period from 16 May 1972 through 15 May 1973.
The studies were sponsored jointly by NASA Headquarter's Mission and
Payload Integration Office of the Office of Manned Space Flight, and the
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center's Engineering and Development Directorate.
Study direction was provided by Mr. Earle M. Crum of the Future Programs
Division, Payloads Engineering Office. He was assisted by a NASA
Management Team representing NASA Headquarters, Johnson Space; Kennedy
Space; Langley Research; Lewis Research; and Marshall Space Flight Centers.
The results of these studies are documented in the following three
volumes:
Space Shuttle Sortie Payload Crew Safety and Systems
Compatibility Criteria Documentation
Volume Title Document No.
I Executive Summary 22214/22215-H013-RO-00
II Crew Safety Design and 22214-HO14-RO-00
Verification Criteria
III Systems Compatibility Design 22215-HO14-RO-00
and Verification Criteria
iii
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND
NASA is currently examining shuttle payload costs in an effort to
both more accurately predict and reduce such costs. History indicates
that the criteria applied by NASA to previous space payloads caused them
to be quite expensive. This practice was acceptable considering the
costs associated with the launch and the necessity for a high probability
of mission success. However, when these costs are used to estimate the
cost of future shuttle payloads, it is evident that there would soon be
a cost factor limiting the use of the shuttle.
Fortunately, the shuttle characteristics will allow selectively
easing many of the cost-inducing criteria now placed on expendable launch
system payloads. Relaxing these criteria is expected to greatly reduce
the cost of space payload development.
Central to those cost-reducing efforts must be the capability to
identify and differentiate between the minimum, mandatory design and
verification criteria for shuttle sortie payloads and all other candidate
criteria for payload projects. Accordingly, this study will contribute
to lower sortie payload costs by producing a methodology capable of
defining only the minimum criteria required for crew safety from a sortie
payload. The resulting criteria will form the basis of future specifica-
tions to be developed when quantitative shuttle data are available.
1.2 OBJECTIVES
The prime objective of this study was to identify the minimum,
mandatory payload design and verification criteria necessary to insure that
sortie payloads are safe with respect to the crew of the space shuttle
system, distinguishing them from those criteria related to mission success,
configuration choices or management approaches which are, therefore, dis-
cretionary to project management as variables in cost/benefit trades.
Specific study objectives are tabulated in Table 1-1.
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Table 1-1. Specific Study Objectives
* Research, identify, and analyze past safety practices in analogous
payload situations to establish a historical perspective and to
utilize available experience.
* Establish categorizing processes for distinguishing between shuttle
mandatory and discretionary crew safety design and verification
criteria.
* Identify the mandatory design and verification criteria that are re-
quired by shuttle management to insure crew safety of sortie pay-
loads with the space shuttle system.
* Identify the crew safety design and verification criteria that are
discretionary to payload management as variables in cost/benefit
trades.
1.3 SCOPE
The scope of this study is bounded by the sortie payload definition
illustrated in Figure 1-1. These elements remain attached to the orbiter
at all times and therefore do not include propulsion systems nor free-
flying satellites. A given sortie payload may interface with the shuttle
mission specialist station (MSS) or the payload specialist station (PSS)
and excludes a remote manipulator system. Several pallets of experimental
equipment may reside in the payload bay as well as piggy-back package(s).
Additionally, as in Skylab, some experiment equipments may also be included
in the shuttle crew compartments.
Accordingly, the criteria derived by this study are applicable to
sortie payload elements carried in the shuttle payload bay or in the crew
compartments,, and are intended to insure the safety of the crew.
Additional criteria which are contained in the systems compatibility
report (volume III of this report) reflect control of incompatibilities
which could have safety implications.
1-2
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Piggy-Back Additional
PSS Panels Package(s) Pallet(s)
-
Experiment
Equipment(s)
Figure 1-1. Shuttle Sortie Payload Philosophy
Because, in general, sortie payloads are pre-phase A in development,
a generalized sortie payload was conceived against which a preliminary
hazard analysis could be scoped. This generalized payload model contains
the subsystems, instruments, and considerations known to be included in
representative sortie payloads and the model is defined in Section 5.
The basic guidelines employed in the study are summarized in
Table 1-2.
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Table 1-2. Study Guidelines
* This study addresses the post R&D, operational shuttle era
assuming a mature, fixed-design, "shuttle airlines" flight
operations capability oriented to low-complexity, low-cost
operations.
* Design and test considerations include only those imposed
by the space shuttle for mission purposes and are con-
fined within the limits from terminal countdown through a
normal landing.
* Whether payload equipment is from the civilian sector or
GFE should not alter the applicability of the shuttle
imposed mandatory criteria. The payload should be given
maximum possible latitude.
* Extravehicular activity (EVA) requirements are not excluded
from a sortie payload. However, shuttle EVA equipment are
excluded from assignment to the payload.
* Study definitions:
- Criteria are general rules by which the acceptability
of shuttle payloads may be determined.
- Specifications are the translations of criteria into
explicit, usually quantitative, statements suitable
for detailed design and test purposes. A criterion may
translate into several specifications.
- Requirements may be criteria or specifications which
have been imposed by appropriate administrative
authority.
- Crew Safety involves those payload design features that
must be satisfied so that any credible hazard (i.e.,
believable as proven by experience or analytical
techniques) is eliminated or its expectance reduced
to acceptable limits of risk.
- Hazards are events or conditions that could cause death
or serious injury to one or more of the orbiter per-
sonnel through either direct means or indirectly via
propagation of vehicle hardware damage (other non-crew-
hazard hardware safety considerations are treated as
systems compatibility).
1-4
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Table 1-2. Study Guidelines (Concluded)
- Mandatory crew safety design criteria and verification
levels are defined, levied and controlled by shuttle
management and are obligatory to all sortie payload
elements.
- Discretionary design criteria make up all other criteria.
Implementation and verification of these criteria are
subject to payload project management prerogatives.
1-5
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2. PRECEDENT PRACTICES RESEARCH
The "precedent practices" research was the first major task of the study.
The objective was to examine past safety practices in order to provide a
basis upon which to recommend those practices and safety criteria appro-
priate for application to Shuttle sortie payloads. Specific candidate
safety criteria were accumulated during the course of the historical re-
search.
2.1 APPROACH
The basic approach to the research phase of the study consisted of
outlining a research plan containing queries designed to derive needed in-
formation, and criteria for selection of the programs to be studied.
Implementation consisted of selecting the programs, gathering and analyzing
the data from these programs, and iterating appropriate conclusions and
recommendations for use in the shuttle era.
2.1.1 Required Information
The first of two parallel efforts defined the information that would be
needed to .establish the criteria which should be recommended for the shuttle
era. The information needed to establish applications to future programs
is represented by the seven data search points summarized below in
Table 2-1.
2-1
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Table 2-1. Research Queries Applied to Each Program
* Determine what criteria were used to write payload design
specifications that were placed upon experimenters to assure
safety. If not available, obtain payload specifications.
* Determine what payload verification criteria or specifications
were used to assure man/vehicle safety from harmful payload
effects.
* Determine which of these design and verification criteria
or specifications were relaxed or revised from their
original requirement, and why.
When criteria were specified, determine the method of
application and the philosophy of the criteria.
Determine which criteria or specifications resulted in
high production or verification costs with respect to
overall costs.
* Indicate how successful the payload was and if any failures
caused safety problems.
Indicate extent to which off-the-shelf or standard components
were used in the payload, and whether failure of these com-
ponents affected non-vehicle safety.
2.1.2 Programs To Be Researched
In selecting the programs from which this information was desired,
attempts were made to choose programs having the most identity with the
space shuttle sortie payload situation. The driving considerations
were these:
* The program should be analogous to the space shuttle
situation, especially where a payload was adapted
to its carrier vehicle.
* Most recent programs were studied so that up-to-date
technology would be considered.
* Unmanned space programs were studied because of the sortie pay-
load remote (unmanned) characteristics.
* Aircraft research programs were studied because of their
operational nature and similarity to the shuttle.
2-2
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Specific attempts were made to use programs from manned and unmanned
spaceflight as well as research aircraft programs such as the Earth Resources
Aircraft Program (ERAP).
Manned spaceflight programs were desired because of the direct man-
rating aspects; unmanned programs because most frequently the payload is
adapted to the carrier vehicle (booster), as will occur with payloads
adapting to the shuttle. Aircraft programs are desirable because they are
the only programs where principal investigators fly onboard and operate the
equipment in flight, as may occur on the Shuttle Program.
Based on these driving considerations, the following programs were
selected for study:
* Apollo Scientific Instrument e USAF Satellite Safety Criteria
Module Bay
* USAF Manned Orbiting Laboratory
* Apollo Lunar Surface
Experiment Package * Pioneer F&G
* Skylab Experiments e P&F Subsatellite
* CV-990 Aircraft Research * Model 35
Program
* High Energy Astronomic
* Earth Resources Aircraft Observatory
Program
2.1.3 Data Search
Information was obtained on the programs by two basic methods:
(1) NASA and contractor personnel who were associated with these programsi
were interviewed, enabling the study team to obtain information pertaining
to the early development stages of these programs where pertinent,
detailed historical documentation was not available, and (2) current
documentation was analyzed to obtain the required information.
While analyzing documentation per the query statements in Table 2-1,
safety criteria were extracted and accumulated for later use where they
occurred.
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2.2 CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions reached as a result of the historical research are
listed in Table 2-2.
2.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on conclusions from research and analysis of the past practices,
recommendations were made to, and accepted by, the NASA management team at
the formal mid-term review. These recommendations affected safety criteria
selection and categorization for use in the shuttle era. The recommenda-
tions are presented in Table 2-3.
2-4
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Table 2-2. Conclusions from Precedent Practices Research
PROGRAM TYPE
CONCLUSIONS : ML
1. JSC has evolved a comprehensive set of X
safety requirements and guidelines. These
requirements and guidelines form a base
from which mandatory space shuttle imposed
requirements can be drawn.
2. Safety requirements and guidelines are not X
presently accumulated into a central
source document.
3. Past and current programs have been pri- X X
marily research and development in nature,
and have levied extensive safety require-
ments on hardware.
4. Operational airborne experiment carriers X
levy significantly fewer safety require-
ments on instrument hardware as compared
to manned spaceflight systems.
5. Present safety requirements and guidelines X X
reflect a conservative research and
development approach. If this approach
and these requirements are utilized in the
shuttle era, the space shuttle operational
capability will be severely technical
and cost constrained.
6. Historically, safety in experiments was X
achieved by the safety discipline adding
necessary safety requirements to a spec.
All safety requirements were then treated
as subsystem design requirements. Safety
involvement was then required only when
non-compliance occurred.
7. Current safety efforts have been oriented X
toward more involvement. In addition to
safety requirements, a hazard analysis and
periodic reporting are required.
8. Research to date demonstrates that only X
government equipment or instruments have
been utilized on manned space flight.
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Table 2-2. Conclusions from Precedent Practices Research (Concluded)
PROGRAM TYPE
C aJ
CONCLUSIONS c -)
9. Flight safety requirements are crew X X X
oriented in vehicles. Ground safety re-
quirements are ground personnel oriented.
10. On programs to date, safety design require- X X
ments have been mandatory, but requirements
which could not be met were frequently
waived. Efforts to comply with a require-
ment which can not be met are expensive, as
is the processing of a waiver. Money spent
in both of these areas can not be re-
covered.
11. Compliance with design requirements is X X X
verified primarily by testing, which is the
method of verification most used by NASA.
12. Testing has been a major portion of program X X X
schedule and program cost.
13. Testing to verify a safety requirement is X
seldom identified directly because most
safety requirements are levied as design
requirements. Compliance with the
requirement is then verified as a part of
subsystem testing.
14. Overall cost can frequently be lowered by X
designing to a greater load factor than
can be imposed, then eliminating testing
requirements. For example, on one air-
craft program, instrument mounts are de-
signed for up to 9g loading with only
analytical verification required, where
the maximum stress which can be imposed
by the aircraft is 3.5g.
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Table 2-3. Recommendations from Precedent Practices Research
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCLUSIONS REFERENCES
1. A payload preliminary hazards analysis should 1, 2
be completed to insure the accumulated safety
requirements base will contain the manda-
tory set of requirements.
2. The safety requirements and guidelines 1, 2
base, verified by the hazard analysis,
form the candidate criteria base which
will be examined in this study.
3. Use should be made of experience gained in 3, 4, 5
manned space programs, but a transfer from
an R&D to a scheduled operational approach
should be effected.
4. The present mandatory set of safety 4, 5,
requirements should be reduced by: 9, 10
* Use of aircraft-oriented requirements
where the space shuttle is most similar
to an aircraft.
* Use of spacecraft-oriented requirements
where the space shuttle is most similar
to a spacecraft.
5. Mandatory requirements for crew safety 4, 6, 7,
should be applied equally to a NASA 8, 9
procured instrument or any independent
payload developer's instrument.
6. The mandatory set of requirements should 3, 5,
be imposed on payload instruments. A 9, 10
mandatory set of safety requirements should
not include functional operation success
requirements.
7. Experience aained to date in space flight 11, 12,
should be used to accomplish verification 13, 14
by the least expensive method which will
provide sufficient assurance of compliance.
8. The mandatory safety testing requirements 11, 12,
should not include any unnecessary testing 13, 14
of instrument functional capability.
REPRODUCIBILITY OF THE
ORIGINAL PAGE IS POOR
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3. CATEGORIZATION PROCESSES DETERMINATION
The objective of this task in the Crew Safety Criteria Study was to use
an analytical approach in the formulation of a methodology and associated
rationale for distinguishing between mandatory and discretionary design
and verification criteria for shuttle sortie payloads.
3.1 APPROACH
A series of analytical steps forming a logic tree was developed as
the most objective method to determine categorization now and in the future.
Several assumptions and guidelines form the basis of the sequential steps
of each of the two processes; the first process to determine the category
of a design criterion, and the second process to determine the level of
verification required to show compliance with a particular design cri-
terion. The basic definitions and guidelines used in addition to the
study guidelines iterated in Section 1 are these:
* The set of mandatory criteria which must be imoosed by
the shuttle for crew safety is not a function of the state
of development of the instrument. An instrument being
designed should be required to meet exactly the same crew
safety criteria as any other off-the-shelf or existing
inventory instrument.
* The definition of safety will be "hazard to the crew"
and includes vehicle hardware damage only where crew
safety is involved.
* An assumption was made that all mandatory criteria
require some form of verification, and discretionary
criteria verification would not be mandatory.
* The process will first examine candidate criteria todeter-
mine that they are sortie payload crew safety criteria.
Then, to determine that each criterion is either mandatory
or discretionary, it is necessary to examine the severity
of consequence of not applying the criterion.
Both the design and the verification categorization processes, because
of their general nature, can be used to categorize safety criteria now, and
as further definition of payloads occur within the shuttle program, the
3-1
22214-HO14-RO-00
processes can be modified to be more specific in nature. This modified
process, together with guidelines representing the specific situation under
study, allows NASA to use these categorization processes as a means of
determining whether a particular criterion is mandatory, together with sub-
stantiating rationale, to protect the crew from injury by malfunction of a
payload.
3.2 DESIGN PROCESS
The objective of the design categorization process is to determine
whether each candidate criterion is mandatory or discretionary with
respect to crew safety. This was done by determining that the criterion
under consideration was applicable to a sortie payload and would apply
to crew safety. Subsequently, the result of not imposing the criteria
is analyzed. A block-by-block discussion and analysis of the main vein of
the Crew Safety Design Categorization process, which is presented in
Figure 3-1, follows.
Block 1. Is the criterion applicable to the payload class under
consideration?
The determination here is to determine if the criterion can be applied to
a sortie payload. More detailed screening of each criterion involves de-
termining whether that criterion applies to a possible subsystem of a sortie
payload or to a subsystem which is precluded as part of a sortie payload,
such as, propulsive system, or satellite, or tug ejection mechanism.
Those criteria found not to apply to a sortie payload are held for separate
delivery to NASA.
Block 3. Does the criterion address a hazard that could endanger
the crew?
The determination is made here as to whether a hazard is being controlled
which applies ultimately to crew safety or compatibility where hardware is
being protected from other hardware. Those criteria found not to apply to
a crew hazard were referred to the Systems Compatibility Criteria Study
for analysis, and the categorization process continues for those which
apply to crew hazard.
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Block 5. Does the hazard fall within the stipulated guidelines?
The guidelines under consideration influence the decision at this point.
For Block 5, the guidelines introduced in Table 1-2 are used. In future
uses by NASA, other stipulations may be used such as more liberal definitions
for the credibility of hazards and/or matters of NASA policy.
Block 7. Do uncontrolled hazards remain when this criterion is applied?
The intent of this question is to determine if applying the criterion
under consideration protects the crew from this hazard, or is the hazard
only partly controlled and additional criteria required to control the
hazard. Note that this question does not refer to other, similar hazards
which must be controlled by other criteria. An example of the use of
this block can be found in F-8 in Table 6-9, which requires shutting off
air circulation in the event of a fire. Two uncontrolled hazards remain:
no breathable atmosphere (required by E/I-18 in Table 6-4) and fire
suppression (required by F-7 in Table 6-9). Thus, the three criteria
together completely control the hazard.
Block 10. Does this criterion prevent a hazardous condition which could
cause direct injury to the crew?
At this point in the process, it was found worthwhile to separate the
situations where a direct payload to crew interface exists (and injury
can be direct via this interface) from indirect injury (where damage to
the shuttle could propagate to the crew member). This is a major branch
in the design criteria categorization methodology.
This branch was necessary because of distinction between the manner
of crew injury. In the direct case, the crew/payload interface is con-
sidered. In the indirect case, hardware damage is considered, and payload
to vehicle interfaces are addressed using the shuttle model to determine
the extent of possible vehicle damage which could result in crew injury.
Block 13. What is the extent of the possible injury?
Upon entering Block 13, we have determined that the hazard is appropriate
for consideration and that injury to the crew member is possible.
3-4
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In Block 13, the determination is made of the extent of injury induced
by the payload hazard if the criterion is not imposed. Four questions are
asked in what might be called decreasing order of severity. These four
questions encompass all crew injury which would be beyond the onboard
medical capabilities and would require mission termination for medical aid.
* Is there immediate loss of life? Immediate loss of life
is defined as a situation where death would occur before
the mission could be aborted.
* Is the injury terminal? This question refers to injury
of a sort (such as a radiation overdose) which
would shorten the life of the crew member, but has no
immediate physical impairment as far as the mission is
concerned.
* Is the injury permanent? Permanent injury is defined as
an injury from which the crew member could not recover,
such as loss of an eye or a limb.
* Is the injury sufficiently serious to require termination
of the mission in order to obtain medical aid? A major
injury such as a broken arm, serious bleeding, or some
physical problem could, in the judgement of the crew
and mission control personnel, require aborting the mission
in order to obtain medical aid.
An affirmative answer to any one or more of these four questions is
sufficient grounds for the criterion to be considered a mandatory design
criterion. A negative answer to all four questions will generate a dis-
cretionary criteria decision indicating that there may be only a minor
crew injury which has basically no effect on the mission or lasting effect
on the crew member(s), and is within the onboard medical capabilities.
Assurance that a hazard would, in fact, cause minor damage or injury to
the crew can be more easily determined during phase C and D of payload
development, and thus has been built into the process here to make the
process more usable in the future.
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Block 11. Is the injury to the crew member immediate or delayed?
Upon entering this block from Block 10, we have determined that a payload
malfunction involving a crew hazard treated by a particular criterion may
cause vehicle damage which can propagate to cause indirect crew injury. A
distinction is made in Block 11 to determine whether this hazard, which can
propagate to the crew, will propagate immediately or can occur after a time
delay. The time delay is defined as sufficient for a normal mission
termination.
The distinction being made here is basically the same as whether
emergency abort procedures will be used, or the crew has time to perform
part of a mission timeline and then perform a normal deorbit and entry.
The abort mode can involve hazardous operations which are not present in
the delayed situation.
Block 12. Is safe mission termination possible?
Upon arrival at Block 12, we have determined that a hazard which can cause
indirect, and delayed (there is time for a early mission termination)
injury to the crew exists. Since the injury is indirect, vehicle damage
must exist. Block 12, therefore, addresses the condition of the shuttle.
Subset questions might be
* Can damage to the shuttle be such that it is aero-
dynamically unstable?
* Might the payload bay doors be damaged and cannot be
closed?
A negative response to the block question indicates payload damage
to the vehicle which prevents entry, making the criterion mandatory. An
affirmative response, indicating minor vehicle damage, leads to an assump-
tion that delayed injury can occur to the crew as a result of the vehicle
damage, thus, making it necessary to terminate the mission early if the
injury is significant. The injury situations in Block 13 are again
considered.
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3.3 VERIFICATION PROCESS DETERMINATION
The objective of verification is to assure compliance with a parti-
cular mandatory design criterion. Study of the five basic methods of
verification as defined in Apollo Test Requirements (Reference 1) was
undertaken to determine under which circumstances each type of verifi-
cation could be considered sufficient to assure compliance.
As was brought out in conclusions (Table 2-2) from the precedent
practices research, experience obtained in spaceflight and spaceflight
hardware construction should allow selective easing of verification
requirements. Since the first five verification methods listed below are
generally less costly than testing of an article, overall programmatic cost
savings can be realized for sortie payloads if testing can be de-emphasized.
The verification process presented in Figure 3-2 is designed to deter-
mine, for each mandatory design criterion, the minimum method of verifi-
cation which can be used to show compliance with the design criterion. If
verification by a method other than testing is sufficient, then testing
of the article to show compliance is discretionary verification to
shuttle management.
Block I. Similarity
Perhaps the most basic method of verification is by similarity. That is,
where a space qualified component is being used in an application similar
to that for which it was originally designed. It has been found that
frequently equipment verified for flight on manned aircraft (such as the
ERAP Program) would be sufficiently qualified to allow the component to
be considered qualified for spaceflight. An example of this would be
vehicle-induced environment.
Block 2. Analysis
Analysis may be used in situations where stress and thermal analyses are
performed and, because of uncertainty, safety factors are frequently
applied. Under conditions where sufficiently high safety factors are
applied, it can be clearly shown by analysis that a hazard has been
controlled and, therefore, actual testing is not required.
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Figure 3-2. Verification Process
22214-HO 4-RO-00
Block 3. Inspection
Frequently, verification can be achieved by inspection of a drawing to
which the hardware will be built. This type verification is most commonly
done at design reviews. A schematic drawing, for example, showing an
arming circuit activated by one switch and a firing circuit activated by
a second switch would be sufficient verification of the mandatory pyro-
technic design criterion (ED-2) found in Section 6 of this report.
Inspection can also include a physical examination of the article, such
as inspection of measurements, shape, or the materials of construction.
Block 4. Demonstration
Demonstration is usually restricted to verification of a man/equipment
interface. This method of verification can be used to demonstrate that
an astronaut can physically perform tasks such as twisting handles or
reaching positions on equipment.
Block 5. Combination
Verification by combining two or more of the previously discussed methods
may be utilized if one method does not provide minimum acceptable
verification.
If none of the four verification methods or any combination of the
four can provide sufficient assurance of compliance with a particular
design criterion, then verification by testing will be required.
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4. CANDIDATE CRITERIA DETERMINATION
Pursuant to the study direction, NASA/JSC agreed to furnish the basic
set of safety criteria. These were complemented by requirements accumula-
ted during the past practices research and by a hazard analysis.
Safety Program Directive No. 1 (Reference 2) defines a hazard reduc-
tion precedence sequence which is paraphrased below:
1) Design for minimum hazards
2) Apply appropriate safety devices where design is incapable
of eliminating the hazard
3) Apply warning devices where some hazard cannot be precluded
4) Develop special procedures to counter a hazard
5) Identify residual hazards which cannot be eliminated
The candidate design criteria were developed with consideration of
this sequence.
This study took the position that all hazards can, in effect, be
"designed out" or controlled by the application of a safety or warning
device. The criteria address these first three categories of the hazard
reduction sequence. Procedural statements were rewritten wherever possible
as design criteria rather than procedural statements. The basis for
this position is that procedural statements should be developed only when
it can be shown that the first three categories (all involving design) can-
not control the hazard. This cannot be shown until design efforts have
proven fruitless, and current shuttle payload design is in an infancy stage.
The procedural statement was rewritten as a design criterion and retained
to help insure that no hazards were overlooked. For the same reason, no
residual uncontrolled hazard can yet be identified.
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4.1 PRIMARY SOURCES
The first conclusion of the Precedent Practices Research Phase of
the study states that NASA/JSC does have a comprehensive set of safety
requirements and guidelines. The primary source of data for this study
phase was the JSC Safety Office who made available (among other documenta-
tion) five significant safety studies (References 3 through 7) which had
been performed for JSC, NASA Headquarters and MSFC over the period of the
last two years. These studies, listed below, supplied a large number of
the safety requirements and guidelines and much useful background informa-
tion about applicabilities and constraints which were used in the Precedent
Practices Research Phase.
* Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Space Shuttle Payloads and
Payload Interfaces (MSC)
* Safety in Earth Orbit Study (NR)
* Advanced Mission Safety Study (Hqtrs/Aerospace)
* Systems Safety Guidelines for New Space Operations Concepts
(MSFC/LMSC)
* Manned Space Flight Nuclear Safety Study (MSFC/GE)
Documentation from all of the programs and collective stand-alone NASA
documents such as MSCM 8080 which were reviewed during the Precedent Prac-
tices Research Phase of the study were sources of existing requirements.
The most significant of these documents are summarized below (References
8 through 13). These six documents, coupled with the referenced safety
studies, supplied virtually a complete set of requirements and guidelines.
* Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards (MSCM 8080)
* Space Flight Hazards Catalog
* Space Vehicle Design Criteria Manual
* Radiation Protection Guidelines and Constraints for Space-
Mission and Vehicle-Design Studies Involving Nuclear Systems
* Standard Satellite System Safety Design Criteria
* System Safety Design Handbook
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All of the sources reviewed represent past and current safety
practices and supplied existing requirements. These requirements needed
to be modulated by the most current shuttle design information. The
shuttle model used was supplied by JSC as was Space Shuttle Baseline
Accommodations for Payloads (Reference 14).
4.2 APPLICABLE HAZARD AREAS
The following twelve hazard areas stem from the traditional hazard
areas listed in the Safety Program Directive No. 1 (Reference 2), as appli-
cable to this study, falling within the study boundaries and guidelines.
* Explosive Devices * Electrical Shock
e Energy Source Isolation e EVA/IVA
* Materials Compatibility * Contamination (including
Toxicity)
* Ionizing Radiation (including
Nuclear Device Considerations) * Fire
* Fuels and Oxidizers * Systems Interactions
Considerations
* Structural
e Pressure Vessels
The following hazard categories were not addressed because these
categories are either outside the scope of the study (as defined in Section
1) or are not applicable to sortie payload hardware.
* Crashworthiness * Docking considerations
* Documentation for sole opera- * Long term storage
tion and maintenance
* Human factors
* Training and certification
* Engress, rescue, survival
and salvage
4.3 CRITERIA SYNTHESIS
The initial accumulation of candidate safety requirements and guide-
lines involved extracting each statement found in all documents reviewed,
with no regard for redundancy or non-applicability. The statements were
then sorted by hazard area and those found to be clearly not applicable
to any sortie payload hazard area were eliminated.
4-3
22214-HO14-RO-00
Nearly 600 candidate criteria were grouped into the 12 applicable
hazard areas and by a process of grouping within each hazard area of simi-
lar statements allowed the groupings of similar statements to subsequently
be synthesized into one criterion statement. A criterion which is synthe-
sized from a group of requirements and guidelines is more general in nature
than any one specific design requirement, and is encompassingof the intent
of all of the separate requirements and guidelines from which it is com-
posed.
During the course of this period of criteria management, the first
two steps of the design categorization process were completed. Criteria
found not applicable to sortie payloads or not applicable to crew safety
(pursuant to the study definition) were removed and either filed as not
applicable or included in the Compatibility Study for consideration (see
Volume III of this report). Likewise, safety criteria were received from
the criteria management effort of the Compatibility Study. The resulting
criteria which were subsequently taken through the process were thereby
reduced to the 132 statements which are included in Section 6 of this
report.
Those "duplicate" and "not applicable" criteria statements which
were removed from further consideration have been retained in separate
files and will be delivered to NASA/JSC under separate cover from this
report. These criteria represent a comprehensive compilation which
will be useful to JSC in other safety work.
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5. HAZARD ANALYSIS
The main purpose of the hazard analysis was to generate a capability
to cross-check the crew safety design criteria population to insure that all
known hazards which could occur on a sortie payload were treated by the
criteria. The hazard analysis was performed as a separate effort to the
accumulation of candidate criteria, with no interchange. In this manner,
objectivity of the hazard analysis is insured.
5.1 ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The scope of this hazard analysis was broad, thereby necessarily
yielding an analysis general in nature. Even though general, the analysis
served the useful purpose of defining the scope of the types of hazards
that might be found aboard sortie payloads. As new experiments are defined,
it is possible that additional specific hazards will be considered.
The basic guidelines of the study were used as boundaries for the
hazard analysis. For example, the time limit boundary basically excludes
GSE and ground activities from consideration, and the definition of sortie
payload eliminates some subsystems from consideration.
In general, only events or conditions that are inherently dangerous
in themselves were considered. If design of device A is influenced so
that a hazard cannot occur, then malfunction of other equipment can still
not cause that hazard to occur on Device A. Events or conditions were
not analyzed if:
* Death or injury could be caused by secondary effects
such as a laser radiating energy on a pressure vessel
causing it to explode, thereby destroying the orbiter.
Pressure vessel design criteria should preclude the
explosion, by relief techniques, thermal control, etc.
* Death or injury could be caused by out-of-sequence
operations, false signals, or failure of system hard-
ware when specific definition of system hardware design
is required to determine the effect of the failure.
The twelve applicable hazard areas for this study were used as guide-
lines, but pursuant to the nature of any hazard analysis, these guidelines
were not limiting or binding.
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5.2 GENERALIZED SORTIE PAYLOAD
At present, a complete sortie payload does not exist upon which a
hazard analysis could be performed. Additionally, analysis of any given
sortie payload would not insure a complete analysis, as no one payload
will have every conceivable subsystem or material which the analysis must
treat.
The basis for this hazard analysis was, therefore, a generalized
sortie payload concept generated to represent all hardware subsystems
which can occur as part of a sortie payload, and to list considerations or
types of conditions which can occur on the sortie payload (such as an
experiment containing microbes).
The generalized sortie payload subsystems and considerations are pre-
sented in Table 5-1.
5.3 ANALYSIS
The analysis followed the outline of the Generalized Sortie Payload,
and therefore, Table 5-1 can be used as an index to the overall hazard
analysis output.
The first step in the performance of the hazard analysis was to gather
information relating to shuttle sortie payloads, the materials for con-
struction, and known hazards involved in instruments and materials which
compose these payloads. Data were gathered from applicable documentation
(References 4', 13, 14, and 15).
The next step of the hazard analysis was to identify, from among the
materials, subsystems, and particular equipment, identifiable mechanisms for
energy release. Associated with each of these energy release mechanisms
are one or more hazards, which are identified and listed as a subset of
the release mechanism classification. The entire output of the analysis
is presented in Table 5-2.
In the later comparison between the hazards identified and the cate-
gorized criteria, five hazards were found to exist for which there were
no criteria. Applicable criteria were generated and categorized.
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Table 5-1. Generalized Sortie Payload Subsystems and Considerations
1.0 MATERIAL 4.0 THERMAL 7.0 INSTRUMENTS 11.0 ELECTRICAL/ELECTRONIC
4.1 Conduction 7.1 Data Circuitry 11.1 Power Circuitry1.1 Metal 4.2 Liquid Loop/ 7.2 Transducers 11.3 Power Suppies
1.2 Plastic Cold Plate 7.3 Electrical (AC Power DC)Supplies
1.3 Composite 4.3 Heaters Instruments4 RF Transmitters
Material 4.4 Insulation 11.4 RF TransmittersMaterial on
4.5 Radiation
8.0 AGENTS
8.1 Reagents 12.0 CREW INVOLVEMENT5.0 PNEUMATICS 8.2 Pathoaens
5.1 Pressure 8.3 Fuels & 12.1 EVA/IVA
2.1 Hatch Vessels Oxidizers 12.2 Control Dis-
2.2 Structures 5.2 Extending 8.4 Fluids & Gases play Interface
2.3 Cryogenic Cooler Mechanisms 8.5 Corrosive 12.3 Direct
2.4 Extendable Booms 5.3 Valves & Lines Fluids Operation
2.5 Antenna 5.4 Compressor
2.6 Gyros
2.7 Shields
2.8 Hydraulics 6.0 ENERGY SOURCES 9.0 POINTING/AIMING 13.0 ENVIRONMENT
(Also Generatino 13.1 Pressure
Equipment Considered) 9.1 Gimballed 13.2 Vibration
Equipment Considered) Platforms 13.3 Acceleration6.1 X-Ray 13.4 Thermal
3.0 CONTROLS & DISPLAYS 6.2 Magnetic Flux 13.5 Humidity
3.1 Control Stimuli (E~II) 13.6 Acoustical3.2 Display 6.3 Radio Frequency 10.0 PYROTECHNICS 13.7 Gravity
Responses (RF)13.8 Natural
3.3 Computer 6.4 Payload Gener- 10.1 Pyrotechnics Radiationural
Operations ated Nuclear 13.9 ContaminationParticles 13.10 Meteoroid6.5 Laser
o
0
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
1.0 MATERIAL
1.1 Metal Magnesium
Aluminum
Beryllium
Steel * Toxic metal
CoLithppum Floride Fragile metal, unexpected structural failure
Mercury e Material at high temperature, metal ignition
Potassium
Binary Hafnium * Flammable metal
Compound * Radioactive
Potassium Sodium
Niobate
Gallium Arsenite
Alumina
1.2 Plastic Teflon e Toxic plastic
Fiberglas * Fragile plastic
Urethane e Combustible plastic
1.3 Composite Wood
Material Ceramic a Combustible material
Carbon Filament 9 Fragile material
Asbestos a Toxic material
2.0 MECHANICAL
2.1 Hatch Hatch e Failure of hatch to function
e Sharp edges on hatch
* Hatch opens inadvertently
a Kinetic energy of hatch when being opened
a Crack occurs in hatch and causes decompression
* Hatch too small in diameter limiting personnel
flow during regular and emergency egress
a Failure of expandable hatchway
2.2 Structures Payload Structure a Structure fails due to fatigue or stress, equip-
ment becomes a projectile
@ Sharp edges
* Caught in structure (EVA activities)
a Prestressed members (stored energy)
* Bending of structure (whipping action)
* Interference with deploying structure
2.3 Cryogenic Cryogenic Cooler a Cryogenic fluid leakage (suffocation)
Cooler a Cryogenic fluid boil off (venting) not occurring
properly
* Tank burst
e Material exposed to cryogenic fluid (material
may burn with LOX)
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis (Continued)
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
2.0 MECHANICAL
(Continued)
2.4 Extendable Extendable Booms for * Stored mechanical energy
Booms Ion Collector * Sharp edges
Target a Rate of movement (kinetic energy)
* Bending of boom (whipping action)
* Stowing of boom
Extendable Antenna * Inadvertent release
Telescopic Boom a Physical interference with critical system
2.5 Antenna Extendable Antenna EVA Activities
* Sharp edges
* Radiating energy
"Sunflower" Antenna EVA Activities
* Bending of structure
* Stored energy
* Deployment
* Inadvertent release
* Rate of movement (kinetic energy)
* Physical interference with critical system
2.6 Gyros Control Moment Gyros * Rotating parts (kinetic energy)
* Electrical shock
* Damping fluids leakage (if toxic or flammable
fluid used)
* Implosion (vacuum container)
• 2.7 Shields Radiation Shields * Radiation
Mechanical Shields * Sharp edges
$Heat Shields e Asbestos shields
Meteorite Absorbing
Shields * Failure of shield
2.8 Hydraulics Hydraulic System * Failure of components (bursting)
e* Moving and rotating parts (kinetic energy)
* Ignition of flammable hydraulic fluid
3.0 CONTROLS & DISPLAYS
3.1 Control Stimuli Computer Output
Control Circuit s Electrical shock
Manual Command a Toxic material such as use of selenium rectifier
3.2 Display Alarms
Response Lights * Display malfunction
Cathode Ray Tube a X-Ray production
3.3 Computer Computer Process * Shock hazard
Operations a Failure of support, equipment becomes a projectile
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis (Continued)
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
4.0 THERMAL
4.1 Conduction Resistance Furnace * Resistance heated furnace (16000 C achievable)
Oxygen Chamber Furnace e Oxygen chamber furnace (32000 C achievable)
* Failure of conducting element, hot metal spewage
Thermal Electric
Chiller e Metals used are toxic
4.2 Liquid Loop/ Thermal Control * Line rupture
Cold Plate Subsystem * Flammable fluids ignition
* Toxic fluids
* Touch hazard, low temperature
4.3 Heaters Heater Systems * Electrical shock
e Touch hazard
a High temperatures
4.4 Insulation Firewall
Heat Insulator * Toxic outqassinq from insulator
4.5 Radiation Quartz Tube Furnace e Touch temp (3000 C)
Induction Furnace * Touch temp (16000C - 2500 0C)
* Plasma electron beam unit (heating)
5.0 PNEUMATICS
5.1 Pressure Heater Systems * Pressure vessel or instrument ruptures, shrapnel
Vessels Refrigeration Systems may result
Cryogenic Systems * Pressure leakage possibly causing structural
Pressurized Containers limits in the carao bay to be exceeded
Pressurized Instruments Leakane of flammable fluids and gases may cause
explosion or fires
* Pressurized vessel or instrument with toxic out-
gassing
e Permeability of container
* Leaking or release of toxic fluids and gases
5.2 Extending Telescopic Boom * Sharp edges
Mechanisms a Rupture of pressurized portion of boom
e Kinetic energy
Rotary.Motion Boom a Hardware interfaces, individual caught between
two items moving relative to each other
a Gas leaks from pressurized portion of the boom,
gas may be flammable or explosive, boom may be
immobilized
Bellows Type Boom a Toxic gases leaking from pressurized portion of
the boom
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis (Continued)
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
5.0 PNEUMATICS
(Continued)
5.3 Valves & Lines Cabin Pressurization
Pressure Vessel e Rupture of valve
e Leakage (internal and external)
Hoses * Line rupture
e Kinetic energy of whipping hoses or line
e Pressure outlet of gas gun
5.4 Compressor Compressor System a Compressor rupture
9 Fire in compressor caused by ignition of oil
vapors
* Leaks
* Escaping gases vented into wrong space
6.0 ENERGY SOURCES
(Also Generating
Equipment Considered)
6.1 X-Ray X-Ray Source * X-Ray radiation (voltage over 15KV)
Radioactive Material e Shock hazard
* Radioactive material (approx. 5 microcuries)
6.2 Magnetic Flux Induction Heating Unit a Loose objects in induction unit
(EMI)
Induction Positioning e RF radiation
Device
Super Conductor e Uncontrolled cryogenic release
Magnet a Electrical shock
9 Sharp edges
* EMI on other system
6.3 Radio Frequency Communication System * Electromagnetic Field
(RF)
R.F. Oven e Heating effects
* Shock hazard
6.4 Payload Radioisotope Power a Radioactive source
Generated Generator e High external temperature
Radioisotope a Ionizing radiation
Calibrator * Resistance load bank (high temperature)
6.5 Laser Laser Operation e Noise
* Exploding components
@ Brilliant light
e IR & UV radiation
* X-Ray
e Cryogens
* Concentrated energy
e Gases
* High voltage
* Heat of laser generator
* Laser beam impingement on other equipment
* Beam impingement on personnel or population
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis (Continued)
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
7.0 INSTRUMENTS
7.1 Data Circuitry Telemetry
Instrumentation * Electrical shock
(Transducer * Toxic materials (selenium rectifiers)
Circuits) * Outnassing materials
Data Processing
Circuits
7.2 Transducers Pressure
Temperature
Vibration
Humidity
Smoke
Fire * Padiation source in transducer
Combustible * Hazardous chemicals
Gases * Electrical shock
Shock
Accelerometer
Geiger Counter
Photometer
Strain Gauges
Fatigue Gauges
7.3 Electrical Electron Microscope
Instruments Radiometer
Altimeter
Cameras
Dosimeter (Active)
Interferometer
Lasers
Life Sciences
Packages * Toxic gas
Materials Processing e Electrical shock
Packages * X-Ray radiation (voltage over 15KV)
Optical Telescopes
Photometers
Radiometer
Scanners
Scatterometer
Specimens (Exposure)
Spectrometers
Terrain Sounder
X-Ray Telescope
8.0 AGENTS
8.1 Reagents Fuel Cell System @ Release of barium oxide
a Release of notassium
8.2 Pathogens Microbiological e Inaestion of nathonens
Experiment hperation e Skin contamination with nathoens
Types of Pathooens:
* Araobacterium
s Tumerfaciens
* Pathoenic and hiahly toxic materials used in
electronhoretic senaration
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis (Continued)
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
8.0 AGENTS
(Continued)
8.3 Fuels & Fuel Cell System * LOX and LH2 reaction (explosive comhination)
Oxidizers
* LOX leakane (Deculiar dangerous properties)
* GOX leakane (peculiar dangerous erooerties)
* LH2 innition (fire not visible)
8.4 Fluids & Gases Cryogenic Cooler Fluid e LN2 leakage not detected (suffocation)
(LN2) * N2-02 mixture changes
* LHe
Work Bay Pressurize * LNe
Vessels a Ammonia, Iodide Cyanide
* Carbon tetrafluoride, paraffin hydrocarbon
* Iodide Cyanide
* Nitrogen Oxides
* Diborane
* Freon
a Formaldehyde
* Carbides
8.5 Corrosive Cooling System * Liquid oxyqen
Fluids * Gaseous oxyqen
a Liquid hydrogen
Battery a Ratterv electrolyte
9.0 POINTING/AIMING
9.1 Gimballed Telescope Gimbal a Rate of movement (kinetic energy)
Platforms * Share edges and corners
* Failure of qimbal stons
10.0 PYROTECHNICS
10.1 Pyrotechnics Pyro Operation a Sound level
e Outgasses
* Explosion
11.0 ELECTRICAL/
ELECTRONIC
11.1 Power Power Hookup Between a Static electricity
Circuitry Interface Equipment a Fires
* Insulation outnassinq
* Explosion of component
* Discharge of capacitor
a Heat dissipation
11.2 Batteries Silver Zinc Battery e Caustic electrolyte
Nickel-Cadmium Battery * Sparks
* Explosion
* Electrical shock
9 Fires
a Leakaqe of GnX and caseous hydroen
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis (Continued)
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
11.0 ELECTRICAL/
ELECTRONIC
(Continued)
11.3 Power Supplies Power Supply Operation * Exposed low voltace or high voltage leads
(AC & DC) * Sparks
* X-Ray from 15KV source
e Corona effect
* Toxic gas or material in tube
* Hardware failure
11.4 RF Operation * Electrical shock hazard
Transmitters * Fire hazard
s Sparking
e Canacitor explosion
* Radiation damage
12.0 CREW INVOLVEMENT
12.1 EVA/IVA Crewman a Lack of control of moving mass
* Sharp edges, corners, and rough surfaces
e See low-gravity hazards (13.7)
12.2 Control and Control Console e See low nravity hazards (13.7)
Display e Sharp edoes and Drojection
Interface
12.3 Direct Payload a Manual mode operation
Operation e Fatique
13.0 ENVIRONMENT
13.1 Pressure Pressure Vessel * Pressure loss
Payload Lab a Sudden pressure change
e Vacuum
13.2 Vibration Structure e Excessive vibration
* Structural failure
a Equipment failure
13.3 Acceleration Structure a Excessive shock
* Excessive acceleration
* Direction change
13.4 Thermal Equipment a High temperature
* Low temperature
* Excessive temperature change
13.5 Humidity Payload Laboratory * Lack of humidity
13.6 Acoustical Payload Laboratory * Excessive noise
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Table 5-2. Preliminary Sortie Payload Hazard Analysis (Concluded)
CATEGORY SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION HAZARD TO CREW
13.0 ENVIRONMENT
(Continued)
13.7 Gravity Equipment * Lack of familiarity of Tow qravity effects
* Inability to control mass
* Effect on human anatomy
* Tumblinq
13.8 Natural Thermal
Radiation Galactic Cosmic
Radiation
Van Allen Belt - * nverdose
Electron & Proton
Ionizing Radiation
Solar Flare Proton
Burst
Gamma Rays
Ultra-Violet
13.9 Contamination Equipment * Experiments with contaminants
* Microbioloqically and bacterioloqically con-
taminatinq waste material
e Oxidizinq environment
* Lack of cleanliness
* Outqassing
* Long term inhalation of non-toxic material
13.10 Meteoroids Meteoroids a Toxic material
* Radioactive material
* Cabin pressure loss
* Structural damaqe
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6. CREW SAFETY DESIGN AND VERIFICATION CRITERIA
The results of the categorization processing of the criteria are a
set of minimum, mandatory and discretionary criteria which are presented
in this section. A summary presentation of all criteria in each hazard
area is given in Table 6-1. A total of 108 mandatory and 24 discretionary
criteria are listed in the following tables:
Hazard Area Table M D
9 Explosive Devices 6-2 9 1
* Electric Shock 6-3 3 --
* Energy Source Isolation 6-4 15 6
* EVA/IVA 6-5 20 2
* Materials Compatibility 6-6 4 --
* Ionizing Radiation * 6-7 13 4
* Contamination/Toxicity 6-8 9 --
* Fire 6-9 8 1
* Fuels and Oxidizers 6-10 2 --
* Pressure Vessels 6-11 14 8
* Structural 6-12 6 2
* Systems Interaction 6-13 5 --
*Includes nuclear devices
These criteria are the primary result of the Crew Safety Study. These
criteria represent the essence of the minimum mandatory criteria required
to insure crew safety with the sortie payloads. Those discretionary cri-
teria included represent a partial listing of discretionary design criteria.
Per the Study Scope, pure "hardware safety" where there was no crew impact
was a subject of the compatibility study. (See Volume III of this report).
6.1 DESIGN CRITERIA
The design criteria presented in the first column of Tables 6-2
through 6-13 are written in a form which includes a statement of the
hazard being controlled.
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Table 6-1. Crew Safety Design Criteria Summary
EXPLOSIVE DEVICES (10) ELECTRIC SHOCK (3) ENERGY SOURCE ISOLATION (21)
* Inadvertent firing 3M, -- e High Voltages IM, -- e Batteries iM --
* Misfire 4M, ID * Isolation, Grounding 2M, -- * Short-Circuit Protection 6M,1D
* Device Size 1M, -- o Overload Protection 2M,lD
o Byproduct Containment lM, -- o Open-Circuit Protection --,2D
* EMI 1M,2D
* Arcing lM,--
* Redundancy IM,--
* Safing Mechanisms 3M,--
* Thermal Extremes --,2D
* Contamination --,1D
EVA/IVA (22) MATERIALS COMPATIBILITY (4) IONIZING RADIATION (17)
(INCLUDES NUCLEAR DEVICES)
o Thermal Extreme lM,-- * Galvanic Corrosion 1Mi, -- * Containment 1M, --
* Inadvertent Actuation 3,-- * Stress 1M, -- o Activation -- , 1D
* Handling 3M,-- e Incompatible Materials 1M, -- * Cooling I1i, --
* Leak Detection lM,-- * Oxidizing or Insulating 111, -- * Coolant Leaks 2, --
* Safina 2M,-- * Fire IM, --
* Failure Identification IM,-- * Radiation 3M, --
* Restraint/Tethers 2M,1D * Monitor/Control 3M, --
* Lighting IM,-- * Jettison/Recovery 1M, 3D
* Isolation Protection 2M,-- Decontamination M, --
e Containment 2M,1D
* Emergency Life Support IM,--
* Sound Pressure Level IM,--
M = MANDATORY D = DISCRETIONARY
Table 6-1. Crew Safety Design Criteria Summary (Concluded)
CONTAMINATION/TOXICITY (9) FIRE (9) FUELS & OXIDIZERS (2)
* Leak/Spill Prevention 2M, -- * Source Limiting IM, -- * Leak/Vent iM, --
& Detection eCleanliness iM, -& Detection Self Extinguishing 1M, -- Cleanliness M, --
* Gas/Vapor Generation 1M, --
e High Temp. Isolation 1M, 1D
* Isolation 2M, --
* Open Flame 2M, --
* Outgassing M, -- Suppression 3M,
* Particulates 1M, --
* Micro-Biology 2M, --
PRESSURE VESSELS (22) STRUCTURAL (8) SYSTEMS INTERACTIONS (5)
* Relief Capability 5M, 1D * Fragmentation 1M, -- e Monitoring/Control 511, --
* Fastening 1M, -- e Manned Volume Walls --, 1D
* Quick Disconnect --, 1D * Extension/Jettison lM, 10D
* Valves 1M, -- * Securing 2M, --
* Pressure Integrity 5M, 5D * Container Integrity 1M, --
* Monitoring 1M, -- * Meteoroid Environment 1M, --
a Dumping 1IM, --
* Overpressure -- , 1D
M = MANDATORY D = DISCRETIONARY 0C)
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The rationale for the design criteria is basically a rendition of how
the criteria moved through the categorization process to become either
mandatory or discretionary. Many of the hazards being treated can cause,
for example, an injury which will be either immediate or delayed. This
has been included, wherever possible, to lend strength to the need for im-
posing the criteria. This feature will allow some easing of the difficulty
of reconsideration of the criteria during later design phases of payloads.
6.2 VERIFICATION CRITERIA
In the Tables 6-2 through 6-12, the verification column presents the
lowest cost level of verification considered appropriate to demonstrate
compliance with that particular design criterion to shuttle management.
The rationale which substantiates the statement is contained within the
verification process (see Section 3.3).
6.3 CRITERIA LIMITATIONS
It has been pointed out that these sets of criteria are restricted
to apply within the boundaries and guidelines of this study to sortie pay-
loads. Additional clarification to the user is included here.
6.3.1 Critical
The definition of safety, as used in this study, addresses crew
safety. Hardware safety is not included except where propagation of a
hardware hazard could impact crew safety. As a result, frequently a
criteria statement includes the word "....critical....". A critical
system or device is one necessary for the crew's safety such as a pyro-
technic which must fire to release a hazardous device, or the environment
control/life support system in a manned pressurized payload.
6.3.2 Ionizing Radiation
The criteria included in this section are expected to be applied to
radioactive or ionizing sources which, in the judgement of NASA/JSC
offices, have significant activity.
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6.4 SUBSYSTEMS CROSS REFERENCE
While in many cases safety criteria are best presented by hazard area,
safety criteria are most useful to a specification writer or a hardware
designer when presented by subsystems. Therefore, Table 6-14 presents a
cross reference from the hazard area to hardware subsystems identified by
NASA. In Table 6-14, each criterion number is listed under the heading of
all subsystems to which it applies.
6-5
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Table 6-2. Explosive Device (ED) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
ED-i. Pyrotechnic devices must Untimely initiation of a pyrotechnic device could Test
not- e susceptible to inadvertent, cause damage to the shuttle vehicle (such as the
untimely ignition caused by elec- payload bay doors) of sufficient severity to en-
trostatic charge buildup; the EMI danger the crew. Immediate injury is possible if
environment of the shuttle vehicle the device detonates while the vehicle is on the
and launch areas; or transient pad or in periods of high acceleration, or if a
ground currents, wherever that pyrotechnic within the manned module detonated at
ignition can cause shuttle damage an inopportune time. Delayed injury would likely
or crew injury. occur if the device detonates while in orbit. The
crew injury would occur either durinq entry, or
because entry is not possible. The criterion is
therefore mandatory. Shielding, circuit design
techniques, and use of already qualified devices
are standard practice.
ED-2. A minimum of two discrete This is a credible situation, considering the Inspection
and separ'ate events must be variety of payloads and quick turn-around, and the
required to initiate a pyro- inexperience of a possible passenqer/P.I. The
technic to preclude accidental hazard would normally be indirect in nature, where
firing by a crew member. the pyrotechnic damages the vehicle, causing de-
layed injury due to possible inability to safely
terminate the mission. The hazard could also cause
direct serious injury or loss of life where a crew
member was nearby (EVA or a pyrotechnic within the
manned volume). The criterion is mandatory. These
events may be accomplished by crew actions, logic
circuits, or software.
ED-3. Power circuits must be Inadvertent or untimely ignition of a pyrotechnic Inspection
separated from pyrotechnic cir- could cause vehicle damage sufficient to prevent
cuits. A power circuit adjacent re-entry (in the case of payload bay door damage).
to a pyrotechnic circuit can pro- Immediate injury or loss of life is also possible
vide an inadvertent ignition in the case of cabin damage by a released object.
source via induction or a short The criterion is therefore mandatory. Separation
circuit. can be accomplished by shieldinq within a harness,
or by use of a separate wirino harness.
ED-4. To preclude misfire, This credible crew hazard (misfire) is controlled Inspection
critical explosive trains must by this criterion. This hazard can produce in-
meet existing requirements for direct injury to the crew by: a) immediate injury
electrical termination, bonding because of failing to jettison a hazardous device;
to the surface to be severed and b) delayed injury because of inability to safely
sealing against vacuum, terminate the mission (such as inability to close
the payload bay doors). In either case, the
criterion is mandatory.
ED-5. If pyrotechnic batteries Inability to fire a critical pyrotechnic device can Inspection
are used, critical pyrotechnic cause an unsafe condition for the crew. This is a
logic circuits must receive power credible crew hazard, which is controlled by this
from a source other than pyro- criterion. Indirect, delayed injury as a result of
technic batteries. The logic not being able to safely terminate the mission can
circuits power consumption can occur if this criterion is not applied. The
cause low voltage and misfire. criterion is therefore mandatory.
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Table 6-2. Explosive Device (ED) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
ED-6. Critical pyrotechnic de- A credible hazard of misfire is controlled by this Inspection
vices must have redundant charges, criterion. Indirect injury could occur to the
initiators, and logic circuits, crew if this criterion is not imposed: a) imme-
such that failure of a single diate serious injury could occur if a hazardous
circuit does not preclude the item could not be jettisoned; b) delayed injury
essential operation. could occur as a result of an inability to jettison
a payload, making safe mission termination impossi-
ble. In either case, the criterion is mandatory.
ED-7. To insure firing of other A credible misfire hazard is controlled by this Inspection
pyrotechnic devices in parallel, criterion, which prevents a short circuit low-
the design of pyrotechnic cir- voltage situation. Indirect crew injury can occur
cuits must prevent constant power if this hazard is not controlled by: a) inability
drain in the event the device to jettison a hazardous item causing immediate
short-circuits upon activation. injury, b) delayed injury occurring from inability
to safely terminate the mission because of in-
ability to jettison an item. In either case, the
criterion is mandatory. Standard design includes
a fusistor in the power lead to the initiator.
ED-8. Explosive charges such as A credible crew hazard is controlled by this Similarity/Test
critical guillotine cutters and criterion. Were this hazard to occur, indirect
other charges must be selected to crew injury could occur: a) delayed, by prevention
perform the required job with a of safe mission termination (an item hanging by a
minimum charge. Devices must be harness loose in the payload bay); and, b) irmedi-
capable of performing the required ate, by failing toremove a hazard (unstable
job under worst case conditions reactor) and the crew being affected by the
with TBD margin of safety. Sizing hazard. In either case, the criterion is mandatory,
requirements are to minimize over-
blast, but assure a complete
jettison.
ED-9. Pyrotechnic exhaust pro- A credible contamination/fire hazard is controlled Similarity/Test
ducts must be contained or con- by this criterion. Indirect crew injury could
trolled to prevent ignition of occur from a fire in the payload hay (or manned
peripheral combustibles or con- volume) immediately, from fire propagation. Direct
tamination of other subsystems, injury could occur within the manned volume from
or direct crew injury. blast effect. The criterion is mandatory.
DISCRETIONARY
ED-IOa. To insure probability of Lack of electrical power to fire a pyrotechnic de-
ignition, critical pyrotechnic vice at the required time can cause a serious
control devices must be provided hazard, resulting in at least delayed crew injury.
with a dedicated power source. However, the source of the electrical power to fire
the pyrotechnic device is in itself the subject of
a cost/benefit trade. In the case of a payload
adding a dedicated battery for its associated
pyrotechnics, using the redundant shuttle to pay-
load power may be more feasible as well as safer
because of a higher reliability on the orbiter
than a supplemental battery. The dedicated source,
then, does not eliminate a credible hazard. The
criterion is discretionary.
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Table 6-2. Explosive Device (ED) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
DISCRETIONARY
ED-lOb. Pyrotechnic systems must Current mandatory requirements are written to re-
have a floating ground to help in quire a pyrotechnic to be unaffected by EPS trans-
the protection of devices from ients, ground currents and EMI surrounding the
inadvertent detonation due to pyro. This criteria then is a redundancy measure,
vehicle EPS transients, ground and though desirable, the removal of this criteria
currents, and EMI if they have a cannot cause an injurious situation to the crew.dedicated power source. However, if ED-lOa is applied, then this criterion
is mandatory to isolate the shuttle sources from
the dedicated sources, and therefore prevent in-
advertent firing via "sneak-circuits" resultinq
from short circuits within the systems. The
criterion is discretionary.
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Table 6-3. Electrical Shock (ES) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
ES-1. Payload equipment having Electrical shock is a credible crew hazard which is Inspection
--Ti-voltage (>TBD volts) com- controlled by this design criterion. Death or
ponents must be designed to pre- serious injury could result from hiah voltane
vent a crew member from coming shock and would be a direct injury caused by pay-
into physical contact with the load equipment, making the criterion mandatory.
high voltage. Protection may be provided by interlocks, bleeder
resistor, insulation, closed cases, etc.
ES-2. All payload module cases This criteria controls two credible crew hazards, Inspection
must be electrically bonded to with no residual hazard. Electrostatic charce
the shuttle structure per shuttle creates an electrical shock hazard to the crew,
grounding requirements to prevent creates the possibility of discharge and thereby
electrostatic charge buildup and provides an iqnition source if flammables are pre-
electrical shock hazard. sent. The electrical discharge and consequent fire
hazard is a credible, indirect hazard which can be
delayed by preventino safe termination; or, imme-
diate loss of life or serious in.iurv. The electri-
cal shock hazard poses possibility of direct injury
to the crew, with the possibility of serious injury
existinq. The criterion is mandatory.
ES-3. Payload modules with self This criterion helps to control the credible Inspection/Test
contained electrical power systems hazards but cannot control the hazards comletelv.
must have these power systems Criterion ES-2 (above) is required to insure
electrically isolated from the control. The shock hazard could cause immediate
payload module case to prevent an loss of life or a serious injury directly to the
electrical shock hazard and pre- crew member. A payload case radiating EII can
vent the case from being a exceed the EMI limit with danger to vehicle and
radiator of internally generated equipment (such as pyros) which could have an in-
EMI. direct injury effect on the crew, either
immediately or delayed. The criterion is manda-
tory.
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Table 6-4. Energy Source Isolation (ESI) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
ESI-1. Batteries must be ther- Two credible hazards are controlled by this Analysis/Test
maTTYisolated from each other criterion. Direct serious injury or death could
and have adequate heat dissipation occur if the battery is in a manned volume. In-
provisions to prevent battery direct, delayed inability to safely deorbit can
overheat and explosion. occur if the battery explodes in the payload bay.
The criterion is mandatory.
ESI-2. A short or open in in- This is a credible hazard, controlled by this Test
strumentation circuitry must not criterion, which can indirectly cause injury to
be capable of adversely affecting the crew by preventino safe mission termination.
other systems which in turn ad- If not properly desioned, a short or open can
versely affect the crew or affect the electrical circuitry within a system
vehicle. causing loss of the system. Loss of a system
which can interfere with the orbiter can in turn
adversely affect the crew (short causes loss of
power to boom extension mechanism). The criterion
is mandatory.
ESI-3. Electrical wiring must not This criterion is designed to protect the vehicle Inspection
be in contact with fluid contain- and crew from credible hazards, and control these
ers. A short from conducting hazards. Any crew injury resulting from the
wiring to the line or tank can hazards stated would be indirect in nature.
cause loss of system integrity A fire or explosion would damane the vehicle, and
with resulting release of hazard- either prevent a safe termination (delayed) or
ous fluids, fires and propulsive propagate and cause serious injury or death
venting. immediately. Any uncontrolled ventina would cause
immediate serious injury. The criterion is
mandatory.
ESI-4. Electrical wiring must not This criterion controls a credible hazard. In- Inspection
be routed near sharp edges. direct, immediate crew injury can occur if the
Chafing of the wiring can cause short occurs in the open payload bay and fire
short circuits, resulting in fire results. Direct, immediate crew injury can occur
and circuit overload hazard. if the short occurs in the manned volume where fire
can injure the crew. The criterion is mandatory.
ESI-5. Adequate provisions must In the manned volume, there is a possibility of Demonstration
r4 be made for maintaining separation fire when the pump shorts out causina arcinQ. This
of coolant and electrical com- is a credible hazard, with the possibility of fire
ponents in pump where the fluid in the cabin and direct injury or death a Dossi-
loop is critical or the pump is in bility. This criterion controls the hazard, and is
SC the manned volume. therefore mandatory.
C) ESI-6. Electrical circuits which Two hazards are credible, controlled by this cri- Inspection
Scan be cut by guillotine cutters terion, and can cause indirect, immediate crewg must be protected against short injury or death. A short to the blade can burn the
circuits and the resultant cir- blade, causing a non-sever hazard, which presents
C 0 cuit overload and fire hazards. an indirect, delayed hazard to the crew by pre-
venting safe mission termination (something floo-
S ping around in the payload bay). The short can
also cause a fire hazard by providinn an ignition
source. The criterion is mandatory in either case.
Standard design is to deadface the harness before
firing the guillotine.
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Table 6-4. Energy Source Isolation (ESI) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
ESI-7. Electrical equipment, This credible hazard is controlled by this cri- Test
wiring, and connectors must be terion. The possibility of a fire as a result of
positively protected against an arc or short circuit could cause an indirect in-
moisture to preclude short cir- ability to terminate the mission safely (delayed
cuits, arcing and resultant fire effect) or immediate loss of life or serious
hazards, injury, making the criterion mandatory.
ESI-8. Capability must be pro- A hazard requiring safing is a credible possibility Inspection
vided to switch off all electri- and could cause indirect injury to the crew. No
cal loads to a payload from the residual electrical hazard could occur if this
orbiter to insure control and criterion is applied. If the criterion were not
safing capability should a applied, damage could be such that safe mission
hazardous situation occur. termination would not be possible. It is equally
possible that the hazard could propagate to the
point where crew injury or loss of life could
occur. The criterion is mandatory to prevent
these occurrences.
ESI-9. Payload modules utilizing These credible hazards are controlled by these re- Inspection
shuttle electrical power must quirements. Occurrence of this hazard could cause
comply with overload protection immediate injury or death to a crew member in-
and grounding requirements of the directly as a result of shuttle damage due to a
shuttle. This will protect the fire, makinn the criterion mandatory.
shuttle from overload, heat, and
fire hazards, and the electrical
power system from damage.
ESI-1O. Payload-generated EMI EMI damage to critical systems can cause loss of Test
muIstE within shuttle require- critical orbiter capabilities (retro-oyros,
ments, such that the payload does communications, GAN, etc.). FMI damage is a
not cause damage to critical credible hazard if outside the specified re-
orbiter systems. quirements. Payload damage to orbiter critical
functions could cause inability to safely termi-
nate the mission. This is a delayed, indirect
hazard to the crew, makina the design criterion
mandatory. Standard design techniques include
grounding, shielding, and filters.
ESI-11. Electrical umbilical dis- Immediate loss of life or serious injury could Inspection
connects between the orbiter and occur to a crew member disconnectina a live
the payload must be separated from connector in the presence of any flammable gas.
hazardous-fluid disconnects, be This would be a direct effect to the crewman, and
qualified as explosion proof or is a credible hazard which is controlled by this
have provisions to remove power mandatory criterion. Standard qualified con-
during disconnect. This is to nectors are available.
preclude electrical arc at dis-
connect, and to preclude hazard-
ous fluids at all times.
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Table 6-4. Energy Source Isolation (ESI) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
ESI-12. Critical, redundant Loss of redundant paths via a single point failure Inspection
paths, such as system monitoring is a credible hazard which is controlled by this
or electrical power circuits must mandatory criterion. Indirect injury could occur,
not be routed through the same either serious injury or loss of life, or shuttle
connector. Routing redundant damage which could preclude safe mission termi-
paths through different con- nation, were this failure to remove all monitoring
nectors precludes loss of re- and an undetected hazard occur. The criterion is
dundancy from a single point mandatory.
failure. (See MSCM 8080,
No. 20.)
ESI-13. Electrical valve con- An improperly open valve presents a credible Inspection
Tigurations must be fail-safe in hazard to the crew, which is controlled by this
nature and removal or interrup- criterion. Dumping or propulsive ventina allows
tion of power must not allow re- for indirect, but immediate crew injury (motion).
lease of fluids, or undesired or Dumping or venting a hazardous fluid could cause
uncontrolled venting. a fire or explosion, either of which could cause
immediate crew injury or death by: a) indirect if
exterior to manned volume; or b) direct if inside
manned volume. For either situation, the
criterion is mandatory.
ESI-14. Safing mechanisms must Uncontrolled hazards (such as uncontrolled oro- Inspection
be Fproided to prevent inadver- pulsive venting, inflating objects within the
tent actuation of equipment whose payload bay, etc.) can cause spacecraft motion or
actuation could result in an damage which will injure the crew. This criterion
immediate uncontrolled hazardous controls the hazard of inadvertent actuation,
situation. which otherwise presents a credible hazard to the
crew. There would be no residual hazard. Any
crew injury would be indirect in nature, although
it could be immediate (uncontrolled ventinn), or
delayed because of structural damage precludina
safe mission termination. The criterion is there-
fore mandatory.
ESI-15. Where possible crew Allowing the experiment equipment to operate under nemonstration
'IJury may result, automatic unsafe conditions allows a crew hazard to exist.
devices must be provided to shut If the equipment is inside the manned volume,
down or prevent operation of pay- direct crew injury can occur. Credible hazards
load equipment under unsafe con- which will be controlled by this criterion can
ditions. occur during equipment operation which could
affect the crew causing direct injury or loss of
life. The criterion is therefore mandatory.
DISCRETIONARY
ESI-16. To preclude loss of bus Battery isolation within a payload is in the in-
otage with loss of one or more terest of R/QA. Failure of a battery may shut
batteries, all payload batteries down a payload, but will not interact with the
must be capable of isolation vehicle, as payload-supplied circuits are isolated
from the bus. from orbiter-supplied circuits. No credible
hazard can occur, thus the criterion is discre-
tionary. Standard design includes diode and re-
lays.
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Table 6-4. Energy Source Isolation (ESI) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
DISCRETIONARY
ESI-17. Payloads utilizing Corrosion of the connectina member could cause loss
batteries must insure that bat- of battery and loss of payload operability. Since
tery cell terminal connection fail safe and isolation from orbiter already is
areas are isolated from any cell required, there is no manned safety impact. The
or battery venting to preclude criterion is discretionary as credible crew safety
corrosion of battery terminal hazard is not involved.
connections, with possible loss
of the battery output capability.
ESI-18. Automatically operated Devices which can fail on will cause an overheat
Tdvices (heaters) in system com- and consequently a hazardous condition. Prime
ponents (tanks, batteries, etc.) result would be loss of the system (fluids vented,
must be designed so as to fail in battery degraded). The excess current drain on
the off mode. Devices which fail the orbiter could be precluded by turnina the
on are a hazard as no control can system down. Over-pressure vents which are re-
be exercised. quired will prevent vehicle damage/crew injury.
This criterion then does not protect a crew
member from a credible hazard but is R/OA oriented
for the payload system. The criterion is there-
fore discretionary.
ESI-19. To preclude undetected Swagged eyelets may result in high resistance or
figT resistance or open circuits, open circuits, resulting in low power or loss of
swagged eyelets must not be used power to the payload. Loss of power to a fail-
to form a solderless connection safe condition in the payload does not present a
between conductors. credible hazard to the crew. This criterion is
discretionary, dealing with the Dayload's ability
to operate.
ESI-20. To preclude inability to The inability of the crew to cycle a Dayload
cycle equipment and return to circuit breaker or replace a fuse and re-start the
normal operation, non-replaceable experiment may cause loss of the experiment. It
fuses and inaccessible circuit does not constitute a credible hazard to the crew,
breakers must not be used, and therefore is discretionary.
ESI-21. Fluid lines must be de- Lines and containers are sized such that
signed and/or insulated so as to there is adequate safety factor to preclude a loss
prohibit freezing or boiling of of system integrity. The worst case occurrence,
the fluid under static and normal then, is loss of the payload or subsystem. Since
flow conditions or, should freez- the payload can be shut down (and fail safe) loss
ing or boiling occur, to prevent of the system involves loss of the payload, but no
permanent system damage. credible hazard can occur, leaving the criterion
discretionary.
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Table 6-5. EVA/IVA (E/I) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
E/I-1. To preclude skin burn This criterion controls a credible crew hazard. Inspection/
or reflex injury, IVA crew members Any injury would be of a direct nature. The injury Demonstration
must not be exposed to payload could be serious enough to terminate the mission.
temperature extremes (less than Extreme temperatures can burn the skin causing
TBD, greater than TBD). injury. Extreme temperatures can also cause reflex
pull away with arm/elbow injury, damage to
equipment to rear of crewmember, inadvertent switch
actuation, etc. The criterion is mandatory.
E/I-2. Critical payload controls Tool non-availability presents a credible hazard Inspection
requiring detachable actuating which is controlled by this criterion. No residual
tools must readily show the con- hazard of this type would occur. Tool nonavail-
trol position without the tool in ability would cause inability to operate control
place. Detachable tools must not under urgent conditions. Indicator non-availability
be used if tool non-availability causes crew members to not know conditions of equip.
could compromise crew safety. ment, both in normal and emergency conditions.
(See MSCM 8080, Nos. 56 and 65.) These conditions would allow malfunction before
correction could be made with resultant crew injury
Inside the manned volume, serious crew injury could
result directly. Outside the manned volume, in-
direct and delayed inability to terminate could
occur, also immediate crew injury or loss of life
could occur. The criterion is mandatory.
E/I-3. Distinctive identification Accidental activation of a critical switch can Analysis/
must be made when otherwise allow hazardous operations to occur (e.g., out-of- Inspection
identical switches are located on sequence), which are precluded by this criterion.
the same panel and the result of Accidental switch activation which can occur on
out-of-sequence operating could critical systems poses a definite hazard to the
be serious. crew. Any injury would be indirect in nature
(for the equipment outside the manned volume) and
could be either immediate injury or delayed in-
ability to safely deorbit. If the equipment is
inside the manned volume, injury can be direct and
immediate. Out of sequence operation can also be
designed out by use of logic circuits or interlocks
The criterion is mandatory.
-4. Critical switch/control Accidental activation of a critical switch can Inspection
configurations must not be sus- allow hazardous operations to occur (e.g., out-of-
ceptible to inadvertent actuation. sequence), which are precluded by this criterion.
Any coverguard must be designed Accidental switch activation which can occur on
so that critical switch/control critical systems poses a definite hazard to the
positions can be determined with- crew. A residual hazard (E/I-3) has been identi-
out moving the coverguard to pre- fied. Any injury would be indirect in nature (for
vent delayed action. (See MSCM the equipment outside the manned volume) and could
8080, No. 59.) be either immediate injury or delayed inability to
safely deorbit. If the equipment is inside the
manned volume, injury can be direct and immediate.
The criterion is mandatory. Standard switch guards
can help preclude inadvertent activation.
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Table 6-5. EVA/IVA (E/I) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
E/I-5. Caution and warning Safety critical parameters (manned atmosphere), Inspection/
systems must provide timely warn- which may go out of tolerance, require timely Demonstration
ing of equipment safety parameters caution and warning to allow corrective actions to
and status of critical control be taken in time to insure crew safety. This
functions (such as airlock pres- credible hazard is controlled by this criterion.
sures, door positions, overboard The type injury/damage is a function of the out of
vents and payload erection/retrac- tolerance subsystem. An ECLS malfunction can cause
tion mechanisms) to allow timely direct, immediate crew injury or death. Retraction/
corrective actions, and avoid erection mechanisms can cause indirect, delayed
accidents caused by lack of know- inability to safely terminate the mission. The
ing systems configuration. criterion is mandatory.
E/I-6. Crew members must not be Torn suit leaves a distinct possibility of loss of Inspection
exposed to sharp points or edges crew member. This credible hazard is controlled
(less than TBD radius of curva- by this criterion. Any injury to the crew member
ture) that could puncture or tear would be direct in nature, and serious injury or
the pressure suit during EVA. loss of life can occur with loss of pressure suit
integrity. The criterion is mandatory. Standard
design such as rounded corners can eliminate this
problem.
E/I-7. Handles or grips must be This criterion is to insure the crew is not in- Inspection/
Fprovded for physical transport jured by loss of control of an object, or by Demonstration
of payload components requiring release of its contents, both of which are credible
transport to preclude loss of hazards. This criterion is sufficient to control
control during transport. Such this hazard, which, if it occurred, could cause
components must be capable of direct serious injury to the crew member by trap-
withstanding impact of TBD feet ping, crushing, or by the release of contents. The
per second with a sharp object criterion is therefore mandatory.
(TBD radius of curvature) without
releasing the contents.
E/I-8. Manned payload modules Allowing undetected environments which allow a Inspection/Test
must provide means for detecting hazard to the crew directly endangers the occu-
and purging or dumping a toxic, pants of the manned module and if undetected can
flammable or oxygen-enriched also propagate to the flight check. This credible
environment (IVA) when such sub- hazard is controlled by this criterion. Any of
stances are part of the payload, these atmospheres caused and undetected by the
payload allows the possibility of direct serious
injury or death by the atmospheres and resultant
chance of fire. The criterion is therefore
mandatory.
E/I-9. Manually operated shut- Any line rupture interior to the manned volume Demonstration
off valves in manned payload allows an undesirable pressure situation in
modules must be located so that addition to attendant hazards directly attributable
downstream line rupture will not to the gas or fluid. Any line rupture external to
prevent access to the valves and the manned volume causes strong propulsive vents
control of the undesired venting. with attendant motion injury. Either situation is
a credible hazard which is controlled by this cri-
terion. Inside the manned volume, direct and
immediate injury or death could occur. Exterior to
the manned volume, erratic motions could cause in-
direct immediate injury or damage which later
prevents safe deorbit. The criterion is therefore
mandatory.
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Table 6-5. EVA/IVA (E/I) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
E/I-10. To preclude erroneous or This criterion requires that the crew be informed Analysis/
aiTFarous crew action, the primary to ignore an erroneous out-of-bounds indication Inspection
failure mode of all critical (unwarranted action not injurious to crew). The
meters or measurement systems must crew must be warned it has lost monitoring capa-
be such as to give an immediate bility and may not know of an out-of-bounds, which
indication that a failure has does allow a hazard to the crew. Acting on bad
occurred. information presented by instruments can lead to a
hazardous situation for the crew. This credible
hazard, which can be controlled by this criterion,
can, if not controlled, lead to either direct or
indirect crew injury. Direct injury if the equip-
ment is within the manned volume or crew member is
EVA. Indirect injury if equipment is in payload
bay. The criterion is mandatory.
E/I-11. All payload fluid/gas Connecting to the wrong lin can introduce the Similarity/
disconnects must be uniquely wrong gas/vent and cause reaction damage and over- Demonstration
keyed, and individually marked to pressure damage which (in a manned volume) can
identify the nature of the sub" propagate to the crew. Leakage after/during dis-
stance involved; must be positive connect can introduce overpressure in the manned
locking; and must be designed to volume and hazardous gas introduction into the
prevent venting/leakage during or manned volume. These hazards are credible hazards
after disconnect. Inadvertent which will be controlled by this criterion. Any
mixing or venting of incompatible crew injury would be direct in nature. Serious
fluids or gases must be precluded. crew injury or death to personnel can occur as a
result of the hazards listed above. The criterion
is mandatory.
E/I-12. All transportable pay- Loss of a tool necessary to insure the safety of Inspection/
load-Ttems (such as tools, the crew with respect to a payload is a real Demonstration
cameras, film magazines) for EVA possibility, can result on an EVA if this criterion
usage must always be restrainable is not applied. Impact from a flying object is
to either the vehicle, worksite also possible if the tool floated into an inaccessi-
or the crewman. Loose items can ble position. In either case, crew injury may
drift into positions where they result indirectly, in a delayed manner and there-
cannot be retrieved, but can do fore this criterion is mandatory.
later damage due to high inertia
on entry. Loss of a tool neces-
sary to perform a critical func-
. tion renders a hazard.
E/I-13. All payload EVA/IVA Lack of adequate light at an equipment worksite may Demonstration
worksites must be lighted to cause operator error and equipment damage. The
those required levels (TBD equipment damage can be of a type to propagate and
luminous) necessary to assure injure the crew. There are situations where in-
non-hazardous operation. correct operation could lead to crew injury (opera-
ting a release mechanism, incorrect switching, etc.)
The hazard is credible, and lighting is a contri-
butor, that, in conjunction with criteria E/I-11
and E/I-3, will prevent injury of both an indirect
delayed nature to the crew, and direct, immediate
injury to a crew member. The criterion is there-
fore mandatory.
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Table 6-5. EVA/IVA (E/I) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
E/I-14. Equipment mounted in the A crew member attempting to unwedge himself could Demonstration
payload bay which requires EVA tear his suit. He could also complicate the
must be positioned to insure that wedging. If it is a single man EVA (Shuttle
a fully suited EVA crew member groundrule), serious injury or death could occur
cannot become wedged, before rescue could be effected. This criterion
controls a credible hazard which, if not controlled
could lead to direct injury or death to the crew
member. The criterion is therefore mandatory.
E/I-15. Internal and external The present docking mechanism and passageway to Inspection
areas of passageways between.a the manned volume is not redundant. Any loss or
manned payload module and the damage to this passage affects the crew in the
orbiter must be free from items manned payload. This criterion will control the
whose malfunction could damage possible occurrence of a credible hazard. Crew
or otherwise prevent passageway injury could occur indirectly by the malfunctioned
use by the crew members. item failing the tunnel and trapping the manned
payload personnel. Serious injury or death could
occur immediately. The criterion is therefore
mandatory.
E/I-16. All crew compartment Items floating in zero-a could enter and block or Inspection
ventilating fans must be protect- damage needed circulation fans, causina a
ed by devices to prevent entrance malfunction hazard to the crew. This criteria
of fan damaging debris during addresses a credible hazard which can occur in a
zero-gravity conditions. (See manned payload. This criterion will prevent this
MSCM 8080, No. 73.) malfunction hazard which would otherwise cause
direct injury to the crew within the manned pay-
load. This direct injury can be serious, and if
undetected, could cause death via air stoppage/
stagnation. The criterion is therefore mandatory.
Normal standard design includes filters, screens,
and fan location within the system.
E/I-17. Shatterable materials Shatterable materials will leave splinters and Inspection
must not be used within a manned sharp edqes floatinq in the manned volume which
volume unless positive can cut and puncture. This is a credible hazard
protection is provided to pre- which can occur within a manned volume. The
vent fragments from entering the hazard involved will be controlled by this cri-
cabin/module environment. Photo- terion. Were a shatter to occur within the manned
graphic equipment that cannot volume, any crew injury would be directly caused
comply with this requirement by the fragments. Serious injury could accumulate
must be protected by suitable because of the many fragments within the confined
covers when not in use. Cathode crew area. The criterion is therefore mandatory.
ray tubes, if used, must have
safety shields. (See MSCM 8080,
No. 41.)
E/I-18. Emergency life support This criterion is to protect the crew from loss of Inspection/
must be provided for all person- the manned payload environment control/life Demonstration
nel in a manned payload module support system (by shutoff, fire, toxic contami-
sufficient to allow escape or nant) which is a credible hazard. No residual
time to control a fire or toxic hazard exists if this criterion is applied. If
spill. this criterion is not applied, loss of the
environment control/life support system of a
manned payload can cause indirect, immediate crew
serious injury or death. The criterion is
mandatory.
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Table 6-5. EVA/IVA (E/I) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
E/I-19. Payloads with a trans- Excessive sound pressure levels (such as the hinh Demonstration
mission medium (such as air or discomfort region) cause discomfort and distrac-
structure) must not generate tion to the crew, increasing the possibility of
sound pressure levels in excess crew error and a resulting hazard. Beyond the
of TBD dB, or crew injury will discomfort level is the pain level, and beyond
result. that, physical injury to ear or brain. This
credible hazard will be controlled by this cri-
terion. Excessive sound pressure levels for some
duration will be a direct source of injury to the
crew. The criterion is mandatory.
E/I-20. Payload equipment utiliz- Equipment such as high speed tape recorders, gears, Demonstration
ing mechanical motion which can etc., pose a hazard to the crew. This credible
trap, cut or otherwise injure the hazard will be controlled by this criterion, pre-
crewmember must prevent crew con- venting direct injury to the crew which would occur
tact with the moving parts. with contact. Standard design practice includes
shielding, covers or interlocks to prevent contact
or stop motion if resistance is incurred. The
criterion is mandatory.
DISCRETIONARY
E/I-21. All payload worksites Attempting to perform a job without proper re-
must have provisions for crewman straint is not possible (pushina in pushes the
restraints, crew-member away). There is a shuttle ground rule
saying crew-member must be tethered. This cri-
terion applies to a sortie payload and a credible
hazard exists (hardware), but the hazard does not
present a credible hazard to the crew member.
This is a crew/payload compatibility problem.
The criterion is discretionary.
E/I-22. Painting or coating Paint chips and flakes loose in the manned volume
materials subject to flaking can interfere with operations. There is not sia-
must not be used in payload equip- nificant possibility of crew-member injury, such as
ment that is expected to be ex- by flakes being inhaled, etc. Manned spaceflinht
posed to extensive abrasion or experience has shown that the possibility of crew
contact by crewman (in the manned injury is not credible. The criterion is
volume). (See MSCM 8080, No. 43.) discretionary.
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Table 6-6. Materials Compatibility (MC) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
MC-1. To preclude metal failure Galvanic corrosion developina at critical points Insoection
on critical systems (mountings, causes weakened metal and eventual failure. One
high pressure, hazardous fluids, must consider more than the 30-day mission time on
etc.), metals of differing critical systems since corrosion starts at assem-
potentials must not be combined. bly, not at flight time. This criterion controls a
(See MSCM 8080, No. 63.) credible hazard, and does not leave a residual
hazard; a) if in the manned volume, such failure
could cause direct injury or death, such as from
flying objects or b) if outside the manned volume,
the failure could cause delayed inability to
safely deorbit due to damage caused by the failure
The criterion is mandatory. Standard design re-
quires appropriate selection, platina, or separa-
ting (such as spaces).
MC-2. Incompatible materials This hazard is a credible hazard, controllable by Insoection/Test
must not be allowed to combine this criterion with no residual hazard. Inside a
where the result of the combining manned volume, such a combination can cause
can cause a hazard to the crew. direct and immediate serious injury or death to
(Included here are such combina- the crew. Exterior to the manned volume, a fire
tions as flammables with liquid is an indirect, but immediate injury to the crew,
or high pressure oxygen, and possibility of death is very strong. The
mutually reactive materials in- criterion is mandatory.
cludinq hypergolics).
MC-3. Materials which can react Some materials (such as sulphur) can outgas and Inspection
with electronic equipment to combine with the copper or other conductor to form
oxide or form an insulating an insulation coating, with consequent loss of
barrier between contacts (such as electrical circuits as well as payload circuits.
sulphur) must not be used in Loss of a critical electrical circuit could become
proximity to critical electrical a real possibility, and is a credible hazard with
equipment. no residual if this criterion is apolied. The
damage to the crew is indirect and delayed. Safe
termination could be prevented, or, may be neces-
sary to prevent some down-stream-in-time danger to
the crew. The criterion is mandatory.
MC-4. To prevent loss of systems Stress corrosion and metal fatigue failure can Similarity/
Integrity on structural mountings cause loss of structure on the pressure system. Inspection/Test
connectors and sleeves on fluid The hazard which can occur is a credible hazard
lines and structures must be of a with no residual hazard if this criterion is
material resistant to stress applied: a) If the pressure system were FCLS or
corrosion cracks when 1) torqued in the manned volume, direct and immediate crew
to required levels and 2) exposed injury could occur; b) if the pressure system or
to expected environment. (See structure is outside the manned volume, indirect
MSCM 8080, Nos. 14 and 113.) and delayed injury to the crew is possible, with
safe mission termination not possible. In either
case, the criterion is mandatory.
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Table 6-7. Ionizing Radiation (IR) Criteria*
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
IR-1. Fragmentation, blast over Any radioactive leak endangers the crew with over- Test
pressure and fireball protection dose and also contaminates the vehicle. This
adequate to assure containment of criterion is to protect the crew against a credible
all radioactive material must be hazard. This criterion would allow direct injurvy,
provided by the isotope-source most likely, premature death resulting from over-
payload supplier to preclude re- dose. The criterion is mandatory.
lease of radioactive material
should a shuttle accident occur.
IR-2. Nuclear device payload Some payloads may have sodium-potassium loops Inspection
suppliers must assure that criti- which may freeze and rupture at cold temoeratures..
cal nuclear subsystems are main- Some Brayton-type systems require constant cooling.
tained at proper temperatures to In either case, the criterion is to eliminate a
remain stable. credible hazard to the crew. No residual hazard
exists if this criteria is applied. Since over
temperatures may result in release of radioactive
material resulting in direct injury or premature
death to the crew, this criterion is mandatory.
IR-3. Reactor payloads must pre- This criterion is designed to eliminate a credible Pressure Test
cTu any leak of sodium- hazard. No residual hazard will exist. A liquid
potassium coolant, Exposure of metal fire could propagate to the crew and there-
the sodium to oxygen will result fore cause indirect, immediate crew injury. The
in a liquid metal fire. criterion is therefore mandatory. Standard design
includes double containment and inert gas blankets
while in the atmosphere.
IR-4. The design of payload re- This criterion is desioned to prevent the occur- Inspection
actor coolant loops that use rence of a credible hazard to the crew. No
sodium-potassium as a primary residual hazard is allowed, and serious crew injury
coolant must not require break- or death could occur directly from exnosure to
ing or opening during orbital sodium-potassium if the criterion is not applied;
operations. The sodium-potassium therefore, the criterion is mandatory.
may be at very high temperatures
and the EVA suit is incompatible
with the liquid metal.
IR-5. A liquid metal fire Liquid metal fires cannot he extinnuished by normal Inspection/Test
suppression system must be pro- methods. The damage of liquid metal release is
vided by the nuclear reactor pay- real during aborts, pad emergencies or hard land-
load for use at any time the ings, and special fire supplements are the only
orbiter is in an oxygen environ- method of controlling such a situation. A real
ment. credible hazard to the crew exists, which is con-
trolled by this criterion. Indirect but immediate
serious injury or death to the crew can occur via
an unsuppressed fire if this criterion is not
applied. The criterion is mandatory,
IR-6. A nuclear payload must be Within payload bay and c.g. envelope constraints, Inspection/
maintained so as not to exceed the greater the distance, the less the dose rate Demonstration
the allowable crew dose rate. that can be tolerated. This criterion is to
reduce a credible (existing) hazard to the crew.
Any injury received as a result of violating this
criteria will lead to overdose and possible pre-
mature death. The criterion is mandatory. Stan-
dard practice is to maintain maximum possible
distance and shielding sufficient to reduce the
dose levels to acceptable limits.
*Includes nuclear devices 6-206-20
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Table 6-7. Ionizing Radiation (IR) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
IR-7. Manned payload modules This criterion is applied against a sortie nayload/ Inspectinn/
must be desiqned for rapid per- sortie payload subsystem. It is designed to con- Demonstration
sonnel evacuation and seal-off, trol a credible hazard to the crew. This criterion
if contaminated, until return to does not completely control the hazard (see also
earth or decontamination can be IR-10 and IR-13). The consequence of not applying
affected, to minimize over- this criterion can be a direct serious injury or
exposure to the crew. premature death from over-exposure; therefore,
the criterion is mandatory.
IR-8. Vidicon design must The amount of radiation a crew member can with- Test
eliminate radiation hazards to stand is limited. An X-ray emittinn vidicon
the crew and/or to surrounding could contribute significantly to this total.
equipments. Since radiation reaching the crew is accumulatino,
a vidicon, which can be part of a sortie payload,
poses a credible hazard to the crew. This
criterion above controls this source of radiation,
not all radiation. Injury to the crew would be
direct in nature, and can cause permanent injury
or premature death, making the criterion mandatory.
Methods of X-ray control include shieldinq and
lower voltage operation.
IR-9. Redundant status monitor- While the nuclear payload itself is not a hazard, Demonstration
Tng and control equipment must be it can easily become one. A malfunction instru-
provided for nuclear payloads. ment is a single point failure of a type which
Indication of instrument mal- prevents the crew from knowinq the condition of a
function shall be included. controllable payload. This criterion is desiqned
to control a credible crew hazard. Injury re-
sulting from this hazard could be: 1) direct in
nature (overdose) resulting in serious injury or
premature death, or 2) indirect in nature (over
temperature, sodium-potassium leak) resultino in
fire and immediate injury or death. The
criterion is mandatory.
IR-1O. Payload suppliers must Locating the released material is a prerequisite Inspection/
provide equipment for locating for any decontamination procedure, and must be Demonstration
radioactive material which has accomplished if the crew is to/must occupy the
been inadvertently released in a area. This criterion is desiqgned to allow control
manned module. of a hazard (remedial measure). The hazard this
would control is credible, and could cause direct
crew injury or premature death if not controlled.
Criteria IR-13 also is important in complete con-
trol of the hazard. This criterion is mandatory.
IR-11. Direct visual or TV This criterion is to eliminate a hazard which is Demonstration
coverage must be provided for credible, and if this criterion is applied, no
nuclear isotope component trans- residual hazard will exist. Any injury incurred
fers so as to allow the crewman as a result of not applying this criterion would
to insure that the radioactive likely be direct, with radiation causinq ore-
material is properly located and mature death or serious injury. Indirect, delayed
shielded. injury could occur if a component were simnly not
properly secured and shifted durinq reentry.
The criterion is mandatory.
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Table 6-7. Ionizing Radiation (IR) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
!R-12. Tracking and recovery This criterion does not directly endanger the crew. Demonstration
e-vices must be included on It prevents danger to the populus because of a
nuclear payloads if, for any crew action or shuttle failure. The criterion is
reason, the payload is jettison- mandatory. Tracking and recovery devices might
able. Recovery of the device is include dye markers, beepers, and flotation oear.
to prevent dispersal of radio-
activity and hazard to the
populus.
IR-13. Pressurized, manned pay- Inability to decontaminate allows the spilled Inspection/Test
load modules, in which hazardous, radiation to cause a continuing added source with
radioactive materials are being attendant overdose to the crew. This criterion is
used, must be equipped with an to control a hazard (remedial action) which is
airlock and with radiological de- credible. This criterion with IR-10 completely
contamination equipment as well controls the hazard. Any injury to the crew would
as waste storage and/or disposal be direct (overexposure) and could be either
provisions. serious injury or premature death. The criterion
is mandatory.
DISCRETIONARY
IR-14. Nuclear reactors must not Activation of an RTG within the carno bay does not
Fe activated while in the in itself pose a hazard to the crew. The criteria
immediate proximity of the applies to a sortie payload, but does not protect
orbiter. the crew from a credible hazard. The criterion is
therefore discretionary.
IR-15. A reactor disposal system Sufficient criterion have been constructed to in-
capability must be provided with sure minimum damage probability. If damane does
all nuclear payloads to boost (to occur, simple jettison would suffice to protect
high-earth orbit) any damaged the crew and vehicle. Roosting to high-earth
reactor power module. orbit is discretionary.
IR-16. Payload reactor/shield Disposal of the shield with the reactor is just as
assemblies must be designed to be acceptable to the crew. No hazard is avoided by
separable if reactor disposal in applying the criterion. It is a cost/benefit to
high-earth orbit is to be used. reuse the shield. The criterion is discretion-
ary.
IR-17. Payloads which can be Consideration must be qiven to such modes for
S jettisoned must be ejectable contingency operation. However, this criterion
through the payload bay doors. does not remove a crew hazard, per se. The hazard
should have been controlled by other criterion in
this section. The criterion can cause another crew
hazard, except on the pad. nn the pad, the isotope
device must be capable of withstanding an accident.SThis criterion is discretionary.
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Table 6-8. Contamination/Toxicity (C/T) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
C/T-1. To preclude inadvertent Accidental spill of a fluid exposes the crew to the Demonstration
sp-lls of hazardous fluids, pay- particular hazard associated with that fluid
load equipment intended for use (fire, poison, acid burn, etc.). This criterion is
as holders, receivers, or trans- designed to protect the crew from a credible
fer devices must have no-spill, hazard. No residual hazard exists if this
positive-sealing characteristics. criterion is applied. Direct, immediate, serious
injury or death can occur from release of a
hazardous fluid if this criterion is not applied.
Therefore, this criterion is mandatory.
C/T-2. To minimize the effect of Since many hazardous fluids can exist, and which Demonstration/
hazardous spills, systems must be ones are used is a function of the payload, payload Test
provided for detection and equipment must sense and warn the crew of spilled,
collection of spilled hazardous hazardous fluids. This criterion applies to suh-
fluids or materials. systems of a sortie payload and is designed to
protect the crew from a credible hazard. A resid-
ual hazard exists, but can be avoided by evacu-
ation of the compartment (see C/T-5). Injury
resulting from undetected hazardous fluids would
be direct in nature, and can cause serious injury
or death, as a function of the fluid. The
criterion is mandatory.
C/T-3. Materials must not be This criterion applies to the materials selection Similarity/Test
used n habital areas of a manned of a sortie payload and is designed to eliminate (For new
spacecraft which will generate a credible hazard to the crew in the manned materials)
toxic or noxious fumes or dust in volume. Direct crew serious injury or death can
such concentration as to impair occur from excessive levels of noxious or toxic
crew safety. (See MSCM 8080, gasses within the manned atmosphere. The
Nos. 18, 33, 51 and 125.) criterion is mandatory. Examples include:
a) un-alloyed Beryllium, h) carbon black,
c) cadmium, d) polyvinyl chloride, and e) teflon
wiring insulation with organic pigments. The
criterion is mandatory.
C/T-4. Toxic, flammable, corro- This criterion is designed to protect the crew Insnection/
sive, or otherwise harmful fluid against a single point failure (rupture/leak of Demonstration
(or gas) containers must be a container) which is a credible hazard. No
located in unpressurized volumes residual hazards exist if this criterion is applied
of pressurized payloads or be Direct, immediate serious crew injury or death
double-contained such that a could occur should such a failure occur, releasina
simple failure of the container the hazardous gas within the manned volume. The
will not expose the crew to the criterion is mandatory.
fluid gases.
C/T-5. If a payload operation This criterion is designed to isolate a credible Inspection/
poses risks of an explosion, fire crew hazard. If the shuttle cabin becomes con- Demonstration
collision, open flame, etc., it taminated, safe mission termination may not be
must not be installed in the possible. This causes indirect, delayed crew
shuttle cabin which is needed for injury which makes the criterion mandatory.
safe shuttle return.
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Table 6-8. Contamination/Toxicity (C/T) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
C/T-6. Outgassinq of payload This criterion applies to sortie payload equipment Similarity/Test
equipment materials in vacuum exterior to the manned volume, and is desioned to
must be at a sufficiently low prevent a credible hazard. No residual hazard
level so as not to deposit on and exists if this criterion is applied. Failure to
obscure or damage sensitive sur- apply the criteria may indirectly affect the crew
faces necessary for shuttle opera- by causing the inability of the vehicle to operate
tion. Non-availability of properly, possibly causinq inability to terminate
critical systems or surfaces the mission. The criterion is therefore mandatory.(such as optics, or damaged
thermal layers) may jeopardize
shuttle operation, and therefore
cause mission termination.
C/T-7. Critical close-tolerance This criterion is to protect the crew against loss Inspection
systems must be adequately pro- of a critical system from narticulate matter.
tected from particulate contami- This credible hazard is controlled by this
nation to prevent loss of the criterion. Injury from loss of a system can befluid system with consequent direct (such as the environment control system) or
hardware failure which could indirect. Indirect injury can he either delayed
propagate to crew hazards. or immediate, and serious injury or loss of life
could occur by any of the three avenues, making the
criterion mandatory. Normal design nrocedure in-
cludes filters and provisions for flushina the
system.
C/T-8. Packing of pathogenic This criterion protects personnel from a credible Analysis/Test
containers must be capable of exposure hazard. No residual hazard exists if
withstanding off-nominal landings this criterion is applied. Direct, serious injury
to protect the crew and ground or death from the disease could occur if the con-
personnel from exposure. tainer were to burst and expose personnel, making
the criterion mandatory.
C/T-9. Payloads containing This criterion will preclude a credible crew Demonstration/pathogenic, microbiological or hazard from occurring, that of exposure to harmful Testbiological experiments must be microbes. No residual hazard exists if this
compartmented to isolate such criterion is applied. Failure to anply this
organisms from human contact dur- criterion would allow exposure of the crew toing ground and flight operations hazardous microbes, with the possibility of direct,in order to protect the health immediate, serious injury or death resulting.
and safety of the crews. Thus, the criterion is mandatory.
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Table 6-9. Fire (F) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
F-I. Flammable or explosive This criterion protects the crew from a credible Analysis
material within TBD feet of the hazard associated with energy release. No residual
single entrance to a compartment hazard exists if this criterion is aDDlied. If
must not, if accidentally re- this criterion were not applied, direct injury by
leased, preclude shirt sleeve the material release could occur to occunants of a
access through the entrance, thus compartment, causing serious injury or death to a
trapping the occupants. crew member. This makes the criterion mandatory.
F-2. Payload materials used This criterion is to protect the crew from an un- Insnection/Test
within the manned volume must be acceptable level of fire hazard. The hazard is
designed to the same flammability credible, and no residual hazard exists if this
constraints as the orbiter. criterion is applied. The occurrence of fire
Where the nature of an experiment within the manned volume creates the possibility
involves a combustible process, of direct, serious injury or death to the crew.
it must be isolated by payload Thus, the criterion is mandatory.
equipment. Fire prevention with-
in the cabin, at least to the
level of orbiter design, is re-
quired to protect the crew. (See
MSCM 8080, No. 22.)
F-3. Equipment containing hot This criterion is to protect the vehicle/crew from Analysis/
surfaces (in excess of TBD 'F) fire on the shuttle, a credible hazard. No resi- nemonstration
must be isolated so as not to be dual hazard exists from this ignition source if
a source of ignition for flam- this criterion is applied. If an ionition were to
mable materials within the occur within the manned volume, direct, serious
manned volume. injury or death could occur from the sustained
fire. If an ignition were to occur exterior to
the manned volume, indirect, serious injury or
death can occur either immediately, due to propa-
gation of the fire, or delayed because of in-
ability to enter as a result of vehicle damage.
The criterion is mandatory.
F-4. Potential ignition sources The criterion applies to subsystems of a sortie Insnection
in the payload (such as switches payload, and is designed to protect the crew
and relays) must be contained so from a credible fire hazard. No residual hazard
as to prevent open arc or spark exists if this criterion is applied. Within a
generation. manned volume, failure to apply this criterion
allows available ignition sources which can
ignite a combustible, causina indirect but
immediate crew serious injury or death from the
fire. The criterion is mandatory.
F-5. Exhaust producing hot gas The criterion applies to a sortie payload subsystem Inspection
systems must not be used by pay- (mounting/jettison capability), and is designed to
loads. Hot gas exhaust by- protect the vehicle and crew from a credible
Sproducts, and/or the flame itself, hazard, which is completely controlled by this
can damage the payload bay area criterion. Indirect, immediate, serious injury or
or cause secondary fires within death can occur, if this criteria is not applied,
the bay. as a result of a fire onboard. Indirect, delayed
inability to safely terminate the mission can also
occur if damage to the payload bay/doors could
cause aerodynamic instability upon entry. The
criterion is mandatory. Jettison can be accom-
plished by closed, hot gas systems, or kinetic
energy methods such as springs.
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Table 6-9. Fire (F) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
F-6. To preclude uncontrollable This criterion protects the crew from a credible Inspection
fires, payloads which introduce fire hazard. No residual hazard exists if this
extraordinary or unusual fire criterion is applied. If in the manned volume,
hazards must supply the necessary failure to apply this criterion allows Donssi-
suppression equipment. bility of fire with direct, serious injury or
death of the crew member occurring. Exterior to
the manned volume, failure to apply this criterion
indirectly jeopardizes the crew by allowing oossi-
bility of fire and vehicle damane, oreventinn safe
mission termination; or if the fire propagates to
the manned volume, immediate, serious injury. In
either case, the criterion is mandatory.
F-7. A manned payload module This criterion protects the crew from a credible Insnection
must have both manually (local) hazard. E/I-18 supplies life support to help
and remotely controlled means of the crew escape the fire should that be necessary.
fire suppression and control. This minimizes the residual hazard. When the
Local control of small blazes, or manned module is occupied, direct, serious injury
remote control of a fire which or death could occur as a result of an unsunpressed
forces evacuation of the compart- fire. When the manned module is not occupied,
ment are necessary to control the inability to remotely extinguish a fire will allow
possibility of crew injury. serious consequences, possible propagation to
the vehicle cabin resultina in indirect, immediate
serious injury or death to the crew. The cri-
terion is mandatory.
F-8. Capability must be provided This criterion is levied against a sortie payload Demonstration
to automatically shut off air subsystem, and is designed to protect the crew
circulation fans in a manned pay- from a credible hazard of fire. The hazard of
load module upon detection of a lack of life support is covered by E/I-18,
fire within that module for pur- and extinguishing the fire by F-7. If this
poses of fire control and con- criterion is not applied, the oxidizer needed for
tainment. support of the fire will not be removed, and in-
direct but immediate serious injury or death can
occur. Thus, the criterion is mandatory.
DISCRETIONARY
F-9. Payload instrumentation and This criterion is levied against a sortie payload,
command links must be protected and is designed to protect the crew from a hazard,
from open fire to insure control loss of payload control. However, the hazard is
capability of payloads. not a credible hazard, as open flame is not al-
lowed, and other criteria are to prevent accidental
fires, leaving the criterion discretionary.
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Table 6-10. Fuels and Oxidizers (F/O) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
F/O-1. To preclude the possi- Accumulation of fuels/oxidizers can cause fire Inspection
bFTIty of fires or explosion, hazard; accumulations which mix can cause danqer
payload cryogenic fuels and of explosion or fire. This criterion controls this
oxidizer systems must be desinned particular hazard. There is no residual hazard.
to preclude accumulation or Any injury to the crew from occurrence of this
mixing of the combustibles in any hazard would be indirect in nature, with a fire/
unintended location, explosion damaginq the vehicle. Immediate serious
injury or death could occur from propagation of the
fire; indirect delayed inability to safely deorbit
could occur if damaqe to the vehicle was exterior.
The criterion is mandatory.
F/O-2. Cleanliness requirements This criterion protects the vehicle and crew from Inspection
for fuel and oxidizer systems a credible explosive hazard. Indirect, immediate
must be consistent with shuttle serious injury or death can occur from these
cleanliness requirements. Con- explosive combinations detonatinq and the result-
taminants in such systems can ant fire propagating to the manned volume. The
form explosive combinations. criterion is mandatory.
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Table 6-11. Pressure Vessel (PV) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
PV-1. Redundant venting pro- This criterion is to protect the vehicle and crew Inspection
visions must be provided on from a credible hazard (overpressure). No resid-
cryogenic and hydrogen peroxide ual hazard exists if this criterion is applied.
systems which have pressure Injury to the crew would he indirect in nature,
buildup in normal conditions, where the overpressure release would affect the
vehicle, and crew members could experience
immediate serious injury or death from pressure
damage or uncontrolled motion due to propulsive
venting. The criterion is mandatory. Secondary
relief valves or burst disks are normal design.
PV-2. Regulator shutoff valve This criterion is to protect the crew from a Test
design must include extremes for credible hazard. Occurrence of this hazard can
temperatures such as the conse- directly affect the crew, causing death or serious
quence of flow through a stuck- injury when the environment control system is in-
open regulator. An inoperable volved, or the equipment explodes in the manned
shutoff valve exposes downstream volume. Indirect, immediate serious injury can
equipment to over-pressure also occur if the regulator sticks and resultant
action. explosion does damage to the vehicle. The
criterion is therefore mandatory.
PV-3. For all payload equipment This criterion is to protect the crew member from Demonstration
requiring an operative vent, a credible hazard. If operation were to take
equipment operation must be pre- place under these conditions, over-pressure and
vented in the event of vent sys- explosion of the vent line could result; direct
tem malfunction to preclude crew injury would result. Injury occurring as a
critical over-pressurization of result of this hazard would be direct in nature
the vent system. with the over-pressured line exploding and frag-
ments injuring the crew member. The criterion is
therefore mandatory.
PV-4. Each payload pressure Relief capability is to prevent exolosion; vent Analysis
system must have a relief capa- restriction is to prevent over-pressure damage to
bility; however, any venting into the orbiter. This criterion is designed to pre-
the payload bay must not exceed vent these hazards, which are credible. If this
the bay venting capability with criterion is applied, there is no residual hazard.
the payload bay doors closed. Any injury to the crew as a result of not apply-
ing this criterion would be indirect in nature,
with the most likely situation heina damage to the
vehicle of such a nature that safe termination
would not be possible. The criterion is mandatory.
PV-5. High pressure gas lines This criterion, if applied, protects the crew from Analysis/
and-vent lines must be secured a credible hazard. This criterion will control Inspection
to preclude a line rupture from the hazard and any crew injury will he indirect in
producing line whipping with nature, most likely by making the vehicle unsafe
consequent damage to the vehicle for mission termination. The criterion is
or injury to a crew member. therefore mandatory.
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Table 6-11. Pressure Vessel (PV) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
PV-6. Components that are sensi- This criterion is to protect the crew from source Test
tive to fluctuations in supply credible pressure source hazards. Direct crew
pressure must be designed so that injury or death could occur if the pressure is
their failure mode does not vio- vented into the manned volume or if a fire can
late the system pressure in- occur. Indirect crew injury can occur if venting
tegrity. Release of the pressur- in the payload bay causes propulsive effects.
ized fluid constitutes a hazard The criterion is mandatory.
to vehicle/crew as well as other
payloads. Hazardous fluids can
cause a direct hazard; other
fluids cause a propulsive vent
(payload bay) or over-pressure
of manned volume.
PV-7. Payload battery cases must This criterion applies and the hazard being con- Test
be capable of withstanding worst trolled presents a credible hazard to the crew.
case over-pressures without There is another criterion (ESI-1) which con-
rupturing. tributes to complete control. Without this
criterion, direct crew serious injury or death
could occur if the battery were in a manned
module. Indirect immediate serious injury
could occur if the battery were external to the
manned volume. The criterion is mandatory.
PV-8. Payload equipment in a This criterion applies and is desioned to nrevent Test
manned volume must be designed to a credible crew hazard from occurrina. Direct,
withstand a rapid decompression immediate, serious crew injury or death could be
without causing a hazardous con- caused by the results of an "exnlosion" of equip-
dition such as exploding or ment during decomnression. The criterion is
allowing flying objects to be in therefore mandatory.
the manned volume. (See MSCM
8080, No. 2.)
PV-9. All hazardous fluid or This criterion is desinned to nrotect the crew Demonstration/
gaseous system valves must be from a credible hazard. If the lines/valves were Test
completely operable with either in a manned volume, or part of the environment
an upstream or a downstream control system, direct, immediate, serious injury
pressure differential equal to or death could occur. If the lines/valves were
the maximum system pressure. Any outside the manned volume, fire and indirect,
value can be called upon to shut immediate injury is possible. The criterion is
off a section of line because of mandatory.
breakage and prevent dumping the
fluid. A vented or dumped
hazardous fluid endangers the
crew directly or indirectly.
PV-10. Fluid and vacuum lines This criterion is to prevent a failure of a line Test
penetrating a manned payload which could act to vent the manned sortie module
module must meet all the design to space or release a fluid into the module.
criteria of the main pressurized This criterion anolies and is desinned to Drotect
volume. Protective systems must the crew from a credible hazard. Should either
be designed with the capability a release of fluid or a vent occur, direct injury
to protect against failure of to the crew could occur and would be immediate,
the largest penetration. with possibility of serious injury or death
occurring. The criterion is therefore mandatory.
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Table 6-11. Pressure Vessel (PV) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
PV-11. Differential pressure On some systems the loss of a differential pressure Inspection
gauges must be designed so that cauqe would allow hazards to go uncorrected. Vent-
the high and low pressure sensing inn any hazardous nas into the cabin from a hurst
connectors cannot be physically gauge also poses a direct hazard to the crew.
interchanged. Loss of the gauge This criterion is designed to protect the crew from
or a burst diagram within the credible hazards. No residual hazard exists if
gauge present hazards to the crew. this criterion is levied. Direct, serious injury
or death could occur if this criterion were not
levied and gas vented into the cabin. Indirect,
immediate, serious injury or death could occur if
a preventable malfunction occurred because of
instrumentation. In either case, the criterion
is mandatory.
PV-12. Payload tank and pressure This criterion is desioned to protect the crew Analysis
vesseT design safety factors must from a credible over-pressure hazard. Failure of
be at least as conservative as pressure vessels, within the manned volume, could
the orbiter safety factors to cause direct, immediate crew serious injury or
insure against loss of the vessel death should over-pressure explosion occur.
and inherent vehicle damage or Pressure vessels outside the manned volume
crew injury. exploding could cause vehicle damage making safe
termination impossible. The criterion is manda-
tory.
PV-13. Pressure vessels and/or This criterion is to protect the crew from a Inspection
Ti-nes that cannot meet at least credible hazard. No residual hazard will occur
the orbiter safety factor, must if this criterion is applied. If the pressure
be protected so that personnel vessel is within the manned volume, failure of the
cannot cause damage, and thus vessel can cause direct, serious injury or death
lower the safety factor of the to the crew member by ventinq a hazardous fluid or
vessels while working on or near from over-pressure. If the pressure vessel is
these components. exterior to the manned volume, failure of the
vessel can cause damage to the aerodynamic cana-
bilities of the vehicle, preventing safe mission
termination. It should be noted that failure
would not necessarily occur when damage occurs;
failure could occur at next pressurization. In
either case, the criterion is mandatory.
PV-14. Capability shall be pro- This criterion applies to a sortie payload sub- Inspection
vided-for the orbiter crew to system (hydrogen, oxynen, etc.) and is desinned to
dump hazardous payload fluids and protect the crew from a credible hazard of fire/
gases overboard within the time explosion on impact/landing. No residual hazard
constraints imposed by an abort exists if this criterion is annlied. Injury as a
situation so the fluids cannot be result of this hazard could be either direct or
released on impact/loading and indirect, but would be immediate in nature with
cause crew injury, and with the serious injury or death resultino from fire/
payload doors opened or closed. explosion. Thus, the criterion is mandatory.
Dumping techniques must preclude
mutually reactive fluids from
mixing and resulting in a fire or
explosion.
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Table 6-11. Pressure Vessel (PV) Criteria (Continued)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
DISCRETIONARY
PV-15. Venting from a pressure This criterion does not protect the crew from a
vessel must be non-propulsive to credible injury hazard. Indirect injury could
preclude motion and off-balance occur as a result of unanticipated vehicle motion
crew injury. if ventinq is propulsive in nature, hut ventinn
impulse versus the shuttle dynamics will not allow
significant motion to occur. Thus, the criterion
is discretionary.
PV-16. A reservoir must be in- Since venting impulse is non-propulsive in nature,
corporated prior to a vent ter- no credible crew hazard can occur from allowing the
minus to permit required system venting to occur. This is a mission success
venting during critical opera- criterion statement. This criterion can he anpplied
tional periods without the to a sortie payload subsystem, but does not
corresponding propulsive forces protect the crew from a credible hazard. The
and contamination around the criterion is discretionary.
orbiter.
PV-17. Quick-disconnects to The only hazard involved with the use of quick-
vacuum must be avoided for disconnects is leakage. (Wrong connectors have
critical functions to preclude already been precluded.) The reliability of
leaks. currently approved quick-disconnects and the
application (plumbing with vent valving) pre-
cludes dangerous leakage. The residual leakage
hazard is not credible. The criterion is
discretionary.
PV-18. When one pressure source Insufficient supply could cause a payload to fail.
suppTies multiple demands, worst However, any failure which could injure the crew
case design demands must be should be precluded by existina criteria, and the
taken into account so that re- under-pressure will not in itself cause danaer to
quired pressures are maintained. the crew. Thouah this criterion can he applied to
a sortie payload, it does not Present a credible
hazard to the crew if not apnlied to the nayload.
The criterion is discretionary.
PV-19. All payload systems Any use of hydrogen peroxide on the payload would
using hydrogen peroxide must be be functional in nature, and not a system upon
designed to permit accurate which the crew would be dependent. Depletion
determination of the rate of of the hydrogen peroxide would terminate the
active-oxygen loss from the experiment, but would not generate a credible
hydrogen peroxide. (See MSCM crew hazard. Pressure and temperature con-
8080, No. 44.) siderations have been treated elsewhere. Thus,
the criterion is discretionary.
PV-20, Where small safety factors Detecting pressure vessel failure may allow some
are envolved (e.g. <2), capability crew action to protect vehicle/crew (such as
must be provided to measure the manual venting); however, ventina, burst disks,
parameter(s) required to detect etc., already preclude pressure vessel failure
potential pressure vessel from over-pressure and impact failure is also
failures. precluded. Thus, this criterion is redundantto
others, and does not protect the crew from a
credible hazard, leavino the criterion as His-
cretionary.
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Table 6-11. Pressure Vessel (PV) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
DISCRETIONARY
PV-21. Gaseous content of Day- This criterinn is desinned to nrotect the crew andr
load pressure vessels with vehicle should a nressure vessel fail. Pelief
necessarily low safety factors ventinn is required to prevent any over-oressure
(<TBD) must be small enough so situations from occurrinn. The only remaininn
that rapid isentropic expansion hazard, then, is a fatinue tyne failure, and the
will not result in a hazardous chances of this occurrinq are not credible.
over-pressure. Although the criterion can be levied on a sortie
payload, and is designed to Drotect the crew, the
hazard beino eliminated is not credible. Thus,
the criterion is discretionarv.
PV-22. Pressure vessels with This criterion is desiqned to prevent shrapnel
critically low safety factors damage when a vessel bursts. However, since
(<TBD) must be of shrapnel- vent provisions are reouired, the vessel will not
proof design or be provided with burst and the hazard is not credible. The
shrapnel-proof barriers. criterion is therefore discretionary.
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Table 6-12. Structural (S) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
S-1. All rotating components This criterion prevents the occurrence of a credi- Analysis/Test
must be designed to preclude ble crew hazard. This criterion controls this
fragmentation damage to the hazard. There is no residual. If fragmentation
vehicle or injury to the crew. were to occur within the manned volume, shrapnel
could cause serious injury or death directly, and
immediately. If fragmentation occurs exterior to
the manned volume, serious damane can occur to the
vehicle, making safe mission termination impossible.
The criterion is mandatory.
S-2. Any payload deployment Uncontrolled motion of Dart of the Davload allows Demonstration
system must provide positive con- impact with, and damage to, the vehicle. In-
trol of the payload movements and ability to remedy a violation of the payload bay
preclude permanent violation of envelope precludes closinq of the doors, and ore-
the payload bay envelope, vents reentry. This criteria applies to the sub-
systems of a sortie payload, and is designed to
eliminate a credible crew hazard. If this hazard
were allowed to occur, indirect injury or death
can occur to the crew (delayed) because of an in-
ability to safely deorbit. The criterion is man-
datory. Stiffness of supports, fail operational/
fail-safe and jettison mechanisms are desinn
techniques to preclude these hazards.
S-3. A safety factor of TBD This criterion applies to a sortie payload sub- Analysis/Test
(referenced to worst case loads) system (mountina) and is designed to prevent a
must be provided all mechanical credible crew hazard. No residual hazard will
fasteners used to lock or secure occur if this criterion is applied. If a fastener
a payload component. or mount breaks loose within the manned volume,
direct, serious injury or death can be caused by
the flying object. If a fastener or mount breaks
loose outside the manned volume, exterior damage
to the vehicle can occur which will prevent safe
entry. The criterion is mandatory.
S-4. Any payload using portable This criterion prevents a credible crew hazard from Insnection
containers must insure restraint flying objects. No residual hazard occurs if this
of the cbntainers when not in use criterion is applied. Unsecured containers flying
to preclude loose object damage about the manned volume can cause direct, serious
to vehicle or injury to crew. injury or death to a crew member by strikina him.
The criterion is therefore mandatory.
S-5. Payloads must not be de- This criterion controls a credible hazard; no Analysis/Test
pendent on internal pressures for residual hazard occurs if this criterion is applied.
structural integrity if the Damage to the vehicle could be of a nature which
shuttle vehicle could be damaged would prevent safe entry (such as payload hay door
by loss of the pressure damage). This would cause an indirect, delayed
(integrity). hazard to the crew, making the criterion mandatory.
S-6. Manned, pressurized volumes This criterion protects the crew from a credible Test
must be designed to operate with- hazard. No residual hazard exists if this
in the meteoroid environment de- criterion is applied. Direct, serious injury or
fined in NASA SP-8013, dated death could occur if this criterion is not applied,
March 1969, to prevent crew injury from sudden depressurization. The criterion is
from sudden loss of atmosphere therefore mandatory.
due to meteoroid impact. (See
MSCM 8080, No. 21.)
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Table 6-12. Structural (S) Criteria (Concluded)
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
DISCRETIONARY
S-7. Payload equipment which This criterion can be levied against a sortie pay-
extends outside the payload bay load, but does not protect the crew against a
must be so located as to not credible hazard. Normal interference of Davload/interfere with docking. dockinq can be avoided by mission timeline; a
stuck-up payload can (and will) be jettisoned; and
the payload can be lowered to facilitate emeraency
docking. Thus, there is no credible hazard, and
the criterion is discretionary.
S-8. Outer pressure walls of a This criterion can be levied aaainst a sortie pay-
manned payload module must be load, but does not protect the crew from a
accessible so pressure leaks can credible hazard. S-6 requires the possibility ofbe located and repaired. puncture to be designed out, per NASA SP-8013; and
even if this low risk incident should occur, the
module can be evacuated using portable life support
equipment, required by E/I-18, and sealed off.
This design criterion is for mission success,
and is discretionary.
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Table 6-13. Systems Interactions (SI) Criteria
DESIGN CRITERION CATEGORIZING RATIONALE VERIFICATION
MANDATORY
SI-1. Safety status payload This criterion requires warning the crew of a Inspection
signals must be provided for crew hazard where control can be exercised over the
display to allow control of pay- hazard. The hazard is credible, and no residual
load hazards. hazard exists if this criterion is applied (it is
controlled). Within the manned volume, direct
serious injury or death can occur from an uncon-
trolled hazard. Exterior to the manned volume,
payload hazards can damage the vehicle, allowing
indirect, immediate, serious injury or delayed
inability to re-enter. The criterion is mandatory.
SI-2. Automatic event-sequencing This criterion protects the crew from a credible Inspection
programs must be capable of hazard of inadvertent operation. No residual
initiation only when commanded by hazard occurs if this criterion is anolied.
a crew member or ground control Inadvertent operation within a manned volume can
if vehicle damage or crew injury cause direct, serious injury to the crew member.
could occur from unplanned opera- Inadvertent operation exterior to the manned
tion. volume can cause damage to the vehicle which will
make reenitry unsafe (such as an extension boom
extending prior to the bay doors being opened).
In either case, the criterion is mandatory.
SI-3. A single-signal mal- This criterion is to preclude a credible hazard, Inspection
function must not generate a inadvertent initiation of sequences which may be
signal which could result in pre- remedial in nature. Such sequences initiated in
mature initiation of subsequent an untimely manner can cause hazardous situations,
sequences. or expend safety measures. The result can be in-
direct, immediate crew injury (by motion from
venting, etc.) or delayed, caused by inability to
enter, making the criterion mandatory.
SI-4. A single instrumentation This criterion controls a credible hazard which Inspection/
failure must not inhibit an auto- can impact the crew. The occurrence of one in- nemonstration
matic warning system from moni- strument indication or malfunction must not allow
toring other functions. another malfunction to go undetected, or crew
injury can result, either directly or indirectly,
as a function of the systems being monitored. The
criterion is mandatory.
SI-5. Provisions must be made Bringina an improperly confinured system on line Inspection
for verifying critical payload can cause a credible crew hazard. This hazard is
systems readiness before placing controlled by this criterion. The equipment or
it on line. A critical system system could react in a manner to cause either
not configured for bringing on direct or indirect crew injury, dependina on the
the line can react in a manner to system and its location. The criterion is
cause a hazard. mandatory.
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p Table 6-14. Subsystems Cross Reference
SAFETY STUDY HAZARD AREAS
0 6
'k,
SYSTEM/INTERFACE AR A (ED) (E) (ESI) (E/I) (M) (IR) (c/T) (F) (F0) (PV) (5) (SI)
APPLICABLE CRITERIA NUMBERS*
COMMUNICATIONS -- 1-3 12 18,19 3 11,12 3,6 3,4,9 -- -- -- 2
CRYOGENICS -- -- 21 1,9,11,15 2-4 3 1-8 1,3,5-7 1,2 1-22 -- 5
S DATA PROCESSING & SOFTWARE -- 1-3 12,15 5,10 3 -- 3 3,4,9 - -- -- 1-5
DISPLAYS & CONTROLS -- 1-3 15 2-5,8-15, 3 3,5,7-11, 2,3,5-7 3,4,7-9 ._ 1-3,9-11, 2 1-518,20,21 13,15 14,19
ELECTRICAL POWER 2-7,10 1-3 1-20 13,15,16, 2,3 5,7-11, 2,3,5-7 1,3-9 2,3,7,9,10, 1-518,19 13-15 17
ENVIRONENTAL CONTROL -- -- 13,21 8,1 15, 2-4 7,13 2-5,7,8 1,3,4,6-8 1,2 1-22 5 --& LIFE SUPPORT 16,18,19
EXT/INT VEHICULAR ACTIVITY 9 -- -- 1-22 2 1-17 2,3,5,7 1,7 -- 13,14 1,3,8 2,5
INSTRUMENTATION -- 1-3 12,15 2,5,8,10, 2,3 3,5,7,9-13, 2,3,5,6 3,4,7-9 3,9-11,14, -- 1-512,16-19 15 19,20
ONBOARD CHECKOUT -- -- -- 2,11,12,20 3 4,9,11,13 2,3,5,7 3,4 -- -- -- 1-5
PAYLOAD ENVIRONMENT 9 -- 10,17,21 1,8,11, 2-4 1,3-5,7,8 2-6,8,9 1,3,7 1,2 8,9 -- --14-22 10,13 -
PYROTECHNICS 1-10 -- -- 15,17,19 3 15 5,6 1,3-6 -- -- 2 --
STRUCTURES -- 2 3,4,14 ,7,9,12.14, 1-4 1,3-7,11, 3,4,6,8,9 1,3-79 1,2 1-22 -8 --
15,17-22 13,15-17
THERMAL CONTROL __ _ 1,5,13,18, 1,11,15 2,3 1,2,4,5 3,6,7 3,4,6 1,2 2,9 -- --
*Listed in Tables 6-2 through 6-13
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7. CONCLUSIONS
During the course of this study, several points were noted that might
be useful to NASA/JSC in implementation of requirements in the Shuttle era.
7.1 STUDY RESULTS
The results of this study will form the basis for detailed payload
specifications to be written when quantitative shuttle data is available.
Utilization of the mandatory design criteria will help assure that future
shuttle sortie payloads insure the safety of the space shuttle vehicle and
crew. Since Shuttle Program management will concentrate only on those
criteria and specifications considered mandatory, considerable cost
savings can be realized by reduced manpower, less need for Shuttle Program
managerial cognizance over certain criteria, and less paperwork. Also,
when new criteria are generated due to changes in subsystems, designs, or
guidelines used by this study, the categorization process can be used to
aid in managerial decision-making concerning the new criteria.
7.2 PROGRAM OFFICES
In past programs, frequently the same program office was responsible
for payloads (experiments) and spacecraft development. This philosophy
lends itself to working out design problems by modification of both the
payload and spacecraft. This type working situation will not be practical
in the shuttle era since the vehicle should not be modified for each suc-
cessive payload. This working situation also leads to the payloads being
designed and qualified to the same standards as the vehicle which is an
expensive practice not necessarily in harmony with shuttle era philosophies.
7.3 SYSTEMS SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA CATEGORIES
It is a conclusion of this study that two seperate sets of systems
safety criteria should be applied to payloads in general.
Safety criteria are necessary to provide crew/shuttle safety from
the payloads. The criteria in this volume relate to crew safety from sortie
payload hazards.
The discretionary criteria in this volume pertain to mission success
for the payload, and are implemented at the option of the payload integrator
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or developer. However, the payload user may decide that these discretionary
criteria may be mandatory to assure success of the payload.
7.4 SAFETY REQUIREMENTS AND GUIDELINES
The NASA/JSC Safety Office has produced a substantial set of safety
requirements and guidelines. When a hardware contract is let, safety re-
quirements are usually levied as part of the contract in addition to a
requirement for a hazard analysis. Once a thorough hazards analysis has
been performed for a type of equipment, subsequent hazards analyses are
replowing old ground, except where new technology is being created on
a particular piece of hardware. If JSC were to compile the accumulation
of available safety requirements and guidelines into one source document,
JSC could more effectively levy a complete set of safety requirements and
eliminate the need for repetitive, detailed hazards analyses except where
new technology is being implemented.
7.5 HARDWARE SAFETY
This study emphasized crew safety, with consideration given to vehicle
hardware safety where vehicle damage could propagate into crew injury. For
other systems safety criteria, the systems compatibility report (volume III)
needs to be taken into consideration.
7-2
22214-H014-RO-00
REFERENCES
1. "Apollo Test Requirements," NHB 8080.1, NASA OMSF, March 1967.
2. "Safety Program Directive No. 1-Revision A (SPD-1A)," 1700.120,
NASA/OMSF, 12 December 1969.
3. "Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Space Shuttle Payloads and Payload
Interfaces," MSC 06815, NASA/MSC, April 1972 (Preliminary).
4. "Safety in Earth Orbit Study," Final Report, MSC-04477, (North
American Rockwell, SD 72-SA-0094-5), NASA/MSC, 12 July 1972.
5. "Advanced Missions Safety," ATR-72(7316-01)-l, Aerospace Corpora-
tion, 15 October 1972.
6. "Systems Safety Guidelines of New Space Operations Concepts,"
LMSC-A968322, MSFC, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company.
7. "Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety," 725D 4201-5-2,
General Electric, January 1972.
8. "Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards," MSCM 8080, Change 4,
NASA/MSC, 21 April 1972.
9. "Space Flight Hazards Catalog," MSC 00134, Revision A, NASA/MSC,
January 1970.
10. "Space Vehicle Operational Design Criteria Manual," MSC 04969,
Volume I, NASA/MSC, 1 December 1971.
11. "Radiation Protection Guides and Constraints for Space-Mission
and Vehicle-Design Studies Involving Nuclear Systems," Committee
on Space Medicine, Radiobiological Advisory Panel, Space Science
Board of the National Academy of Sciences, 1970.
12. "Standard Satellite System Safety Design Criteria," USAF/SAMSO,
10 February 1972.
13. "Systems Safety," AFSC DH 1-6, USAF/AFSC, 10 January 1972.
14. "Space Shuttle Baseline Accommodations for Payloads," MSC 06900,
NASA/MSC, 27 June 1972.
15. "Reference Earth Orbital Search and Applications Investigations
(Blue Book)," NHB 7150.1, NASA, Volumes I through VIII, January
1971.
R-1
22214-HO14-RO-00
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Advanced Missions Safety," ATR-72(7316-01)-I, Aerospace Corporation,
15 October 1972.
"Apollo Applications Program Experiment Hardware General Require-
ments," MSC-KA-D-68-1, Revision B, NASA/MSC, 27 January
1970.
"Apollo Spacecraft Nonmetallic Material Requirements," PA-D-67-B,
NASA/MSC, February 1968.
"Apollo Test Requirements," NHB 8080.1, NASA/OMSF, March 1967.
"Basic Safety Requirements," NHB 1700.1, Volume VI, NASA, July 1969.
"Centaur Payload User's Manual," NASA CR-72109, General Dynamics
Convair Division, August 1966.
"Checklist of General Design Criteria," AFSC DH 1-X, USAF/AFSC,
15 January 1970.
"Delta Payload Planner's Guide," McDonnell Douglas, Rev. June 1970.
"Design Requirements for Shuttle Payloads," NASA Memo from Dale D.
Myers to Philip E. Culbertson, 23 February 1973.
"Electromagnetic Compatibility Requirements MOL System Orbiting
Vehicle," TOR-0200 (4107-28)-2, Aerospace Corporation,
June 1968.
"Flammability, Odor, and Offgassing Requirements and Test Procedure
for Materials in Environments That Support Combustion,"
NHB 8060.1, NASA, November 1961.
"Gemini B Oxygen Safety Study, Volume VII, Simplified Two Gas System,"
F415, McDonnell Astronautics Company, 19 May 1967.
"General Requirements for Hardware Procurement," D2-118444-1, Boeing,
21 July 1972.
"HEAO System Safety Requirements Document," Contract No. NAS 8-26273,
TRW, 23 April 1971.
R-2
22214-H014-RO-00
bIbLIOGRAPHY (Continued)
"Ionizing Radiation Control,".AFETRM 160-1, USAF/AFETR, 20 September
1972.
"Manned Safety Assessment of MSC Experiments, Design Certification
Review," Volume VII, Section III, NASA/MSC.
"Manned Spacecraft Criteria and Standards," MSCM 8080, NASA/MSC,
26 April 1971.
"Manned Space Flight Nuclear System Safety," 725D 4201-5-2, General
Electric, January 1972.
"Military Standardization Handbook, Metallic Materials and Elements
for Aerospace Vehicle Structures," MIL-HDBK-5B, DOD,
1 September 1971.
"MOL Ground Test Plan, Acceptance Test Plan, Volume I, AVE Components
Through Subsystems and AGE CEI's," DAC-57179, Douglas,
25 June 1968.
"MOL Program Detailed Test Plan for Material Properties," TOR-
1001 (2107-30)-4, Aerospace Corporation, December 1966.
"MOL Program Structural Criteria for the Laboratory Vehicle Segment,"
TOR-1001 (2107-30)-3, Aerospace Corporation, December 1966.
"MSC Guidelines for Establishing Safety Requirements for Space Flight
Contractors" (Preliminary), MSCM1702, NASA/MSC, July 1972.
"NASA CV-990 Laboratory Experimenters' Handbook," NASA/ARC, November
1970.
"Particles and Fields Subsatellite Project, System Hazard Analysis,"
2260.1 4-34, TRW, 14 July 1970.
"Preliminary Hazard Analysis of Space Shuttle Payloads and Payload
Interfaces," MSC 06815, NASA/MSC, April 1972, (Preliminary).
"Procedures and Requirements for the Flammability and Offgassing
Evaluation of Manned Spacecraft Nonmetallic Material,"
D-NA-0002, NASA/MSC, July 1968.
R-3
22214-H014-RO-00
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Continued)
"Radiation Protection Guides and Constraints for Space-Mission and
Vehicle-Design Studies Involving Nuclear Systems," Commit-
tee on Space Medicine, Radiobiological Advisory Panel,
Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences,
1970.
"Range Safety Manual," AFETRM 127-1, USAF/AFETR, 1 September 1972.
"Reference Earth Orbital Search and Applications Investigations
(Blue Book)," NHB 7150.1, iNASA, January 1971.
"Research and Applications Modules (RAM) Phase B Study," GDCA-DDA72-
006, General Dynamics, 12 May 1972.
"Safety In Earth Orbit Study," MSC-04477, (North American Rockwell
SD 72-SA-0094-5), NASA/MSC, 12 July 1972.
"Safety Plans, Programs, and Procedures," SAMSOM 127-1, Volume IV,
USAF/SAMSO, 14 August 1970.
"Safety Program Directive No. 1-Revision A (SPD-lA)," 1700.120,
NASA/OMSF, 12 December 1969.
"Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Provisions for
the Space Shuttle Program," NHB 5300.4(1D), NASA,
December 1972.
"Shuttle Orbiter/Payloads Monitor and Control Interface Study,"
SD72-SA-0043, North American Rockwell, 1 May 1972.
"Skylab System Safety Checklist Experiment Ground Support Equipment
Design," SA-003-004-2H, NASA/MSFC, November 1971.
"Skylab System Safety Checklist Experiment Systems Design," SA-003-
003-2H, NASA/MSFC, November 1971.
"Skylab System Safety Checklist Ground Support Equipment Design,"
SA-003-001-2H, NASA/MSFC, July 1971.
"Sortie Laboratory Guidelines and Contraints Level I," NASA,
15 August 1972.
R-4
22214-HO14-RO-O0
BIBLIOGRAPHY (Concluded)
"Space Flight Hazards Catalog," MSC 00134, Revision A, NASA/MSC,
January 1970.
"Space Shuttle Baseline Accommodations for Payloads," MSC 06900,
NASA/MSC, 27 June 1972.
"Space Shuttle EVA/IVA Support Equipment Requirements Study
Presentation," Contract No. NAS 9-12506, Hamilton
Standard, 14 June 1972.
"Space Shuttle Science Instrument Development Studies," JPL Job No.
612-50101-0-823, Jet Propulsion Laboratory, 18 September
1972.
"Space Station Program Phase B Definition," MSC-00737, (North
American Rockwell/SD 70-145), NASA/MSC, 13 March 1970.
"Space Vehicle Operational Design Criteria Manual," MSC 04969,
Volume I, NASA/MSC, 1 December 1971.
"Standard General Requirements for Safe Design and Operation of
Pressurized Missile and Space Systems," MIL-STD-1522, DOD,
1 July 1972.
"Standard Satellite System Safety Design Criteria," USAF/SAMSO, 10
February 1972.
"Study of Space Shuttle EVA/IVA Support Requirements," Vought
Missiles and Space Company, 15 June 1972.
"Systems Safety," AFSC DH 1-6, USAF/AFSC, 10 January 1972.
"System Safety Checklist, EREP Tape Recorder Breakout Box,"
(MMC SK840000176-009), MSC-05397, NASA/MSC, 11 May 1972.
"System Safety Program For Systems and Associated Subsystems and
Equipment, Requirements for," MIL-STD-882, DOD, 15 July,
1969.
"Systems Safety Guidelines of New Space Operations Concepts,"
LMSC-A968322, MSFC, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company.
"Titan IIIC Payload User's Guide," MCR-68-62 Rev. 2, Martin Marietta
Corporation, 7 October 1969.
R-5
